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EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN: REACHING THE
LIMITS OF INDOPCO'S FUTURE BENEFITS WITH THE
JUST-IN-TIME MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
Overzealous descriptions of company programs designed to
motivate employees may trigger dire tax consequences. The
Danaher Corporation ("Danaher") discovered this disturbing fact
when the IRS ("the Service") denied the immediate deduction of
employee training costs incurred while implementing a Just-in-
Time (JIT) manufacturing system.' In requiring Danaher to
capitalize the costs, the Service relied on Danaher's own descrip-
tion of 'long-term benefits" obtained from "New Technician[s]"
trained in the JIT philosophy.' In actuality, the JIT system
used the same factory, machines, and employees to manufacture
the same products; only the method of use changed.' The de-
scriptions, however, led the Service to conclude that Danaher's
extensive training created a new business that would not qualify
for an immediate expense deduction otherwise available to exist-
ing businesses.4 This result further complicates the somewhat
amorphous expense/capitalization debate.
The difficulties inherent in determining the proper treatment
for various expenditures have fueled an endless conflict between
taxpayers and the Service. For large corporations, capitalization
issues comprise the primary source of contested tax determina-
tions.5 Even though the Danaher ruling cannot provide reliable
1. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
2. Id.
3. See Letter from'James H. Ditkoff, Vice President, Finance & Tax, Danaher
Corporation, to U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman (Aug. 14, 1995) (on file with the Wil-
liam and Mary Law Review) [hereinafter Ditkoff Letter].
4. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995) (noting that the new "process
represents a fundamental change in [Danaher's] operations and is a radical redesign
of its manufacturing operations"); see also Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985) (allowing immediate expense deductions for employee
training costs incurred when teaching employees how to operate new machines in an
existing business); Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-53 I.R.B. 1 (requiring the capitalization of
training costs only when seeking future benefits significantly greater than those tra-
ditionally obtained from training).
5. See Tax Administration, Recurring Issues in Tax Disputes Over Business Ex-
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precedent for other taxpayers,6 it suggests that many other
businesses face the risk of unanticipated adjustments related to
their training expenditures.7 This threat appears realistic in
light of recent claims of increasingly aggressive IRS behavior in
capitalization issues,8 despite a denial by the Service of any
change in its policy.' Regardless of any change in position, the
pense Deductions, GAO/GGD-95-232 (Sept. 26, 1995) (reporting that of 117 IRS Office
of Appeals cases filed by large corporations, capital expenditure issues comprised
42% of the issues contested and $1.1 billion of the $1.9 billion in proposed tax ad-
justments), reprinted in GAO Identifies Most Common Business Expense Deduction
Issues Between IRS and Taxpayers, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 189-39, Sept. 27, 1995,
available in DIALOG, TNT Database.
6. Section 6110 prohibits other taxpayers from relying on a Technical Advice
Memorandum (T.A.M.) issued to another taxpayer as precedent. See I.R.C. §
6110(j)(3) (1996). Despite a T.A.M.'s taxpayer-specific application, it may provide
valuable rationales for the tax treatment of various expenditures. These rationales
may apply to other taxpayers' individual circumstances without rising to the level of
precedental authority. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the "Authorities: Deter-
mining Valid Legal Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax
Returns and Avoiding Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1103 (1988) (discussing the authori-
tative significance of a TAM.); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in
1995) (stating that even when a taxpayer lacks a written determination based on a
T.A-M. naming the taxpayer specifically, the "taxpayer may have substantial authori-
ty for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of the appli-
cable statutory provision").
7. See Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Rules Against Danaher on One-Time Tax Write-
Off, Conversion Decision Could Affect Other Firms, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1995, at
D1, D2 (reporting that during Danaher's dealings with the Service, "[an IRS official
'[remarked] that there are billions of dollars at stake and [Danaher is] just the first
one[ ] up'") (quoting James H. Ditkoff).
8. See Laura Saunders, The Agents Run Riot, FORBES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 144
(discussing the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), on corporate taxation issues); see also Paul M. Barrett &
Randall Smith, High Court Denies Tax Deductions for Takeover Fees, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 27, 1992, at B8 (pointing toward aggressive IRS enforcement and the denial of
deductions for takeover fees in INDOPCO as the sources for potential tax adjust-
ments for companies involved in mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s).
9. See Lee A. Sheppard, Is the IRS Abusing INDOPCO?, 56 TAX NOTES 1110
(1992) (citing an IRS official's assertion that "traditional principles still prevail"
when deciding capitalization questions); Letter from Stuart L. Brown, Chief Counsel,
Department of the Treasury, to Bill Archer, Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 1996) ("[T~he service has issued
a series of revenue rulings holding that INDOPCO does not change the fundamental
legal principles for determining whether a particular expenditure may be deducted
or capitalized."), reprinted in IRS Chief Counsel's Response to Archer on FAA-Inspec-
tion Costs, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 198-44, Oct. 9, 1996, available in DIALOG, TNT
Database.
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ruling adds uncertainty to the treatment of training expendi-
tures at a time when manufacturers implement new processes
and procedures almost daily."0
This Note examines the Service's position on JIT training ex-
penditures. The first part provides a brief overview of the man-
agement philosophy of JIT to assess its implementation and ex-
pected results. The second part shifts the focus to the evolving
classifications of expenditures requiring capitalization. The third
part considers the specific application of these classifications in
light of some recent IRS rulings and one case involving an ex-
panding business. This Note then concentrates on the Danaher
ruling and concludes that the new business characterization ap-
pears inappropriate. Furthermore, the recurring nature of the
JIT training expenditures and the lack of a clear association
with future benefits requires a current deduction to avoid a dis-
tortion of income. The last part of this Note explains that other
expenditures with patterns resembling the recurring nature of
JIT training, with similarly indeterminable benefits, also require
an immediate deduction.
10. See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at D2. Some of the uncertainty in the capital-
ization area may be attributable to the lack of clear guidance from the Service after
the Supreme Court decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
See Lee A. Sheppard, INDOPCO Redux in the Manufacturing Sector, 68 TAX NOTES
1154, 1156 (1995) ("[Tlhe IRS has chosen to deal with the capitalization question
through technical advice, resolving taxpayer questions on a case-by-case ba-
sis... .. "). Recently the Service requested comments on whether it should issue gen-
eral guidance on capitalization principles. See I.R.S. Notice 96-7, 1996-6 I.R.B. 22.
Some early comments advocated that the Service should continue to provide guid-
ance through revenue rulings. See Sheryl Stratton, INDOPCO Issues Continue To
Perplex Practitioners and IRS, 71 TAX NOTES 992 (1996). Others have urged guid-
ance in the form of regulations. See, e.g., John W. Lee et al., Restating Capitaliza-
tion Standards and Rules, 15 OHIO N.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (suggesting in-
terpretive regulations that set forth the clear reflection of income standard, a. pre-
sumption of capitalization when expenditures produce future benefit, and "rough jus-
tice" exceptions to capitalization).
Beyond the potential for increased uncertainty as a result of the Danaher ruling
lies the concern that the inability to deduct these expenditures will raise manufac-
turing costs and will harm U.S. competitiveness. See Laura Saunders, How To Fight
the IRS, FORBES, Jan. 22, 1996, at 64 ("Isn't [the ability to deduct Danaher's conver-
sion expenditures] what international competitiveness is all about?"); Ditkoff Letter,
supra note 3. But see Sheppard, supra, at 1154 (criticizing attempts to justify an
immediate deduction with the rationale that it improves a company's international
competitiveness).
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THE JUST-IN-TIME PHILOSOPHY
JIT manufacturing represents an approach to decreasing costs
and increasing efficiency during the production process." Un-
like some production control methods, JIT encompasses an en-
tire "philosophy of manufacturing." 2 At its heart lie two "com-
mon sense" aspects: the "elimination of wasteful practices" and
the "habit of improvement." 3 The elimination of waste aspect
stresses that nothing should remain "in the production pro-
cess.., unless it adds value to the product."'4 The habit of im-
provement complements this elimination of waste by seeking to
improve the remaining parts of the process. 5 These aspects
appear in the basic JIT components of flow, quality, and employ-
ee involvement. 6
The flow component typically concerns itself with eliminating
the waste caused by maintaining large inventories. 7 It focuses
on creating reductions in lead time throughout the entire pro-
cess to avoid delays and the accumulation of inventory at any
stage in the manufacturing process. 8 To reduce lead times and
inventories within the system, JIT strives to accomplish a con-
tinuous materials flow that arrives at the next stage of produc-
tion at the very moment that it is needed. 9 This streamlined
11. See Paul H. Zipkin, Does Manufacturing Need a JIT Revolution?, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 40. The JIT philosophy can apply outside of manufacturing
settings. Even white-collar "factories" can benefit from JIT's approach to eliminating
waste within a system. See Joseph D. Blackburn, Time-Based Competition: White-Col-
lar Activities, BUS. HORIZONS, July-Aug. 1992, at 96, 99 ("Although we have made
great strides in simplifying manufacturing ... administrative processes still resem-
ble the factories of the 1950s and 1960s.").
12. Shirley A. Hopkins, An Integrated Model of Management and Employee Influ-
ences on Just-In-Time Implementation, S.A.M. ADVANCED MGMT. J.; Spring 1989, at 15.
13. ANTHONY DEAR, WORKING TOWARDS JUST-IN-TIME 11 (1988).
14. Hopkins, supra note 12, at 15. Although definitions of adding value may differ,
generally "[o]nly an activity that physically changes the product adds value." ED-
WARD J. HAY, THE JUST-IN-TIME BREAKTHROUGH: IMPLEMENTING THE NEW MANUFAC-
TURING BASICS 16 (1988).
15. See DEAR, supra note 13, at 11.
16. See HAY, supra note 14, at 15.
17. But see DEAR, supra note 13, at 12 (stressing that JIT seeks to eliminate all
waste within a system and not just that associated with inventories).
18. See Uday Karmarkar, Getting Control of Just-in-Time, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 122, 123.
19. See id. Hence the name "Just-in-Time" captures the goal of synchronized pro-
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system can reduce capital funds previously held in inventories,
while the short lead times can increase the system's flexibility
and enable it to respond to specialized customer needs.2" These
potential benefits from a relatively simple concept earned JIT
praise as "a return to basics" that offers "a new vision of manu-
facturing-a purer efficiency than managers ha[ve] ever
known."2 '
JIT's apparent simplicity obscures its latent ability to produce
calamitous results. Accumulated inventories provide a safety net
that can be drawn upon when an unexpected event disrupts the
manufacturing process.22 In addition to introducing unique
duction. This concept of a continuous flow might be analogized to a fire brigade at-
tempting to extinguish a fire by using buckets of water. See id. at 126. By handling
one bucket at a time, each person receives the next bucket only after passing the
last. See id. As buckets are passed along the line, an inventory of buckets will not
accumulate as long as each person passes the buckets at approximately the same
rate; the whole line reacts to avoid any accumulations so that only the slowest buck-
et passer restricts the overall pace. See id. In a manufacturing setting, work product
would replace the buckets, and it would pass between production cells instead of
individuals.
Some companies extend the continuous flow concept outside of the factory walls
by including suppliers as a key element of the production system along with employ-
ees and equipment. See Michael A. Cusumano, Manufacturing Innovation: Lessons
from the Japanese Auto Industry, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1988, at 29, 32 (present-
ing a Japanese manager's observation that efficient manufacturing required effective
utilization of equipment, workers, and suppliers). These firms often attempt to coor-
dinate delivery schedules with suppliers to avoid an unnecessary accumulation of
raw materials. See id. at 33. But see Dexter Hutchins, Having a Hard Time with
Just-In-Time, FORTUNE, June 9, 1986, at 64 ("[As a supplier, olur people go to
meetings where the bastards [purchasing agents] are up there pounding on the table
telling you how it's going to be.") (quoting Ken- Stork, Purchasing Director of
Motorola, Inc.); John H. Sheridan, Just in Time: Two Perspectives, INDUSTRY WK.,
Sept. 18, 1989, at 26, 27 ("[With large customers demanding tight delivery sched-
ules,] small firms tend to see themsetyes as the 'whipping boys' in the JIT cycle.");
Zipkin, supra note 11, at 46 (remarking that cooperation rarely occurs and manufac-
turers often coerce suppliers into complying with new JIT schedules).
20. See Karmarkar, supra note 18, at 123-24.
21. Zipkin, supra note 11, at 40. This vision might not be that new. See John F.
Krafcik, Triumph of the Lean Production System, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1988, at
41, 42-44. Henry Ford's reason for developing mass production plants was that "the
most efficient way to produce a vehicle is to minimize the time that elapses between
beginning and completing production." Id. at 43. Unlike the JIT approach, Ford de-
veloped his concept with volume, standardization, and vertical integration. See id.
22. See P. Robert Duimering et al., Integrated Manufacturing: Redesign the Orga-
nization Before Implementing Flexible Technology, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1993,
at 47, 48 ("[Ijnventory within a manufacturing system is a buffer that absorbs vari-
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problems caused by operating at low inventory levels, JIT re-
veals problems that previously were masked by the system's
ability to continue operating by using the inventory safety
net.' Without a net, "[simall amounts of inventory mean that
the wrong part, machine breakdowns, absent workers, nonstan-
dard design components, and sudden schedule changes will rap-
idly disrupt the manufacturing system."24 An inability to deal
effectively with these common problems may prove disastrous.'
JIT's habit of improvement attempts to address these prob-
lems by emphasizing quality and the importance of employee
involvement. Arguably the most important feature of JIT,26
quality enhances production flow by "doing it right the first
time;"  product flow cannot occur when components require
continual reworking and inspection.2" Building quality into
products enables the line to keep moving.2" Implementing this
philosophy requires the cooperation and involvement of employ-
ees who will endure most of the changes firsthand.0 Gaining
ability between interrelated manufacturing processes.").
23. See DEAR, supra note 13, at 14; Vivian Brownstein, The War on Inventories Is
Real This Time, FORTUNE, June 11, 1984, at 20, 21 ("With minimal stockpiles at
each stage of production, inefficiencies, bottlenecks, and quality problems reveal
themselves . . . ."). Exposing latent problems hidden by inventories is like finding
rocks in a lake: lower the water level and expose the rocks. See DEAR, supra note
13, at 12.
24. Duimering et al., supra note 22, at 49.
25. See DEAR, supra note 13, at 12.
26. See Jinichiro Nakane & Robert W. Hall, Management Specs for Stockless Pro-
duction, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1983, at 84, 88 (asserting that most impedi-
ments to achieving a repetitive system are caused by quality defects).
27. HAY, supra note 14, at 30.
28. See Harold Sirkin & George Stalk, Jr., Fix the Process, Not the Problem, HARV.
Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1990, at 26, 28-30. Operations will not improve by simply identi-
fying defective products before they go out the door. See id. at 30. Improvement results
as businesses move through several phases of first preventing defective products by
adjusting the system after it malfunctions, second locating and fixing the root cause of
the problems, and finally learning to anticipate how this system knowledge can be
used to create an unsuspected competitive advantage. See id. at 28-32.
29. See generally DEAR, supra note 13, at 91-92 (discussing an example of a press
shop that was forced to stop production constantly so that fitters or quality inspec-
tors could adjust the presses to eliminate defects in the products).
30. See HAY, supra note 14, at 174 ("JIT ... requires people to develop different
attitudes and behaviors."). Employee involvement in turn requires the support and
patience of management as the process undergoes a transformation. See Sirkin &
Stalk, supra note 28, at 32-33.
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employees' commitment to improving quality requires employee
involvement.3'
Beyond the general common objectives of eliminating waste
and improving the underlying system, JIT develops its particu-
larized character in the individual businesses that adopt it.
3 2
Although this "fungible concept"' lacks a standardized form,
the implementation of JIT appears to have taken two distinct
courses: the pragmatic and the romantic.'
The pragmatic approach simply views JIT as addressing prac-
tical problems within the manufacturing system.35 A pragmatic
implementation proceeds slowly, with careful deliberation over
minor aspects of the production process, to accomplish small feats
that aid in the manufacturing process. 31 Inventory reductions
follow this slow pace when the "process-improvement tactics ...
do their work before pushing inventories down further." 7
The pragmatic implementation of JIT uses continuous im-
provement to develop the system through an "accumulation of
many small gains in efficiency over a sustained period of
time."38 Creating sustainable improvements through a series of
31. See DEAR, supra note 13, at 91.
32. See Zipkin, supra note 11, at 40 (explaining that different managers who have
worked with JIT may have different ideas about what it is, and what it does). Al-
though often attributed to "pull" systems, see Karmarkar, supra note 18, at 122, JIT
works with either "pull" or "push" systems. See id. at 124. Pull systems respond to
a present customer demand by beginning production; push systems prepare produc-
tion schedules to meet future demand. See id. at 123.
Danaher implemented an inventory control method known as kanban. See Tech.
Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995). All variations of a kanban system use cards to
communicate between production cells; each card authorizes the manufacture of a
set-number of units by a cell. See DEAR, supra note 13, at 41-42. In general, as a
downstream cell needs component parts, it provides an upstream cell with a card
and a container intended to hold the desired number of parts. See id. Once the up-
stream cell completes the request, it returns the container and card to the down-
stream cell. See id. As the upstream cell needs to replenish its components, it sup-
plies its own upstream cell with a similar card and container. See id. This procedure
continues throughout the entire system and, therefore, constitutes a basic pull sys-
tem. See id. For a general discussion of kanban systems, see J T. BLACK, THE DE-
SIGN OF THE FACTORY WITH A FUTURE 156-78 (1991).
33. Zipkin, supra note 11, at 50.
34. See id. at 41.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 44
38. Id. at 41. Many Japanese manufacturers realized great improvements in inven-
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process refinements provides greater benefits than attempting to
address all problems with a one-time change. 3' The proximity
of the line-employees to the process makes them ideal sources
for most of these improvements; they are positioned to investi-
gate the process, suggest improvements, and monitor the results
of any changes instantly.4" Thus, the improvements within the
system occur from "employee experience and creativity" in an
environment with a "natural equilibrium [of] constant improve-
ment and change."4'
In contrast to a pragmatic implementation, a romantic ap-
proach seeks a revolution in the workplace.42 Often motivated
by the perceived threat of foreign competition, this approach
mandates urgent change toward the goal of simplicity.4 3 JIT
does not simply improve operations, rather it involves a com-
plete and immediate transformation of the company." Any part
of the organization that hinders progress needs to be eliminat-
ed.45 In particular, romantics cut inventory levels in order to
drive reform rather than let inventory levels fall as a result of
reform.46 Frequently, this type of reform results from the moti-
vations of senior managers acting without regard for their
tory levels, lead times, and productivity only after an approximate five-year period.
See Nakane & Hall, supra note 26, at 87. For example, Toyota Corporation spent 25
years modifying a die-changing procedure, reducing the time for this procedure from
several hours to several minutes. See Zipkin, supra note 11, at 41.
39. See Cusumano, supra note 19, at 38. The process of continuous improvement
closely relates to inventory levels:
All . . . inventory levels . . . come from an inability to solve the techni-
cal and organizational problems that keep a plant from reaching its goals
of stockless production. Relentless effort to solve them focuses attention
on the simple modification of equipment or procedure needed to meet the
endless little difficulties that crop up.
Nakane & Hall, supra note 26, at 85.
40. See Janice A. Klein, The Human Costs of Manufacturing Reform, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 60, 61.
41. Dean M. Schroeder & Alan G. Robinson, America's Most Successful Export to
Japan: Continuous Improvement Programs, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 1991, at 67.
42. See Zipkin, supra note 11, at 6.
43. See id. ("The name of the movement is not, after all, 'Almost-In-Time'.").
44. See id ("Kanban is something that can be installed between any successive
pair of processes in 15 minutes, using a few containers and masking tape.") (quoting
RICHARD SCHONBERGER, BUILDING A CHAIN OF CUSTOMERS (1990)).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 42-44.
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subordinates' roles on the actual factory floor.47 Driven by a
top-down approach, management seeks the revolution's benefits
but fails to consider the real consequences that may be inflicted
upon the manufacturing operations; instead of coordinating
process improvements and inventory reductions, management
unleashes all the problems caused by inventory reductions in the
hope that JIT will take hold." These rash acts sometimes pro-
duce "gruesome tales of chaotic plants, furious customers, and
financial wreckage."49
EXPENDITURE CLASSIFICATIONS
Every business expenditure faces two alternate routes that
eventually lead to the tax return. The first leads to the inviting
immediate deduction as a business expense." Eligibility, how-
ever, depends on the "ordinary and necessary" nature of the ex-
pense.5 Ordinary expenses connote a "normal, usual, or cus-
tomary" character,52 suggesting a degree of recurrence, in the
business operations. 3 The necessity of the expense imposes a
minimal hurdle that the expense appear "appropriate and help-
ful" in the business.' Despite the emphasis frequently placed
on the terms "ordinary and necessary," other requirements stip-
47. See id. at 44; DEAR, supra note 13, at 104 ("The blunt truth is that many
managers don't know what is happening in the operations for which they are re-
sponsible.").
48. See DEAR, supra note 13, at 14 ("When the building is burning down we don't
think of developing a fire prevention system."); Zipkin, supra note 11, at 44.
49. Zipkin, supra note 11, at 40.
50. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1996).
51. Id. ("allow[ing] as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business").
52. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) ("[Ain expense may be ordinary
though it happen but once in the taxpayer's lifetime. Yet the transaction which gives
rise to it must be of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business in-
volved.") (citations omitted).
53. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 216-17 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("Most of the 'ordinary,' in the sense of recurring, expenses of a business
are noncapital in nature and most of its capital expenditures are extraordinary in
the sense of nonrecurring.").
54. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966). But cf May v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2498 (1996) (questioning the helpfulness of contributions
made to a church by a piano service and sale business).
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ulate that the expense be paid or incurred during the taxable
year, while carrying on the business.55 The last requirement
prevents the deduction of "start-up" costs.5"
The alternate route leaves the taxpayer with a nondeductible
capital expenditure." These expenditures include the purchase
of assets and improvements or restorations that increase the
value or life of property." Unlike their expense counterparts,
capital expenditures presumably leave the taxpayer with some-
thing of value after the end of the tax year. Despite the appar-
ent harshness of denying a deduction, the Internal Revenue
Code ("the Code") generally permits the taxpayer to deduct a
ratable portion of the asset's cost over its estimated useful life59
in order to represent the theoretical exhaustion or wear caused
by asset use.0
55. See I.R.C. § 162(a); Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345,
352 (1971) (outlining the statutory requirements of an allowable expense deduction).
56. See I.R.C. § 195 (requiring capitalization rather than deduction, but allowing
an election to amortize start-up expenditures). Two alternative rationales support the
disallowance of a business expense deduction for start-up costs. First, during the
period of business preparation, the business has not "begun to function as a going
concern and perform[ I those activities for which it was organized." Richmond Televi-
sion Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per
curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). Second, expenditures during the prepa-
ratory stage might provide benefits in future tax periods and require capitalization.
See Fishman v. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988); Blitzer v. United
States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1982); infra notes 113-40 and accompanying text
(discussing future benefits). These rationales leave open the debatable question of
when a business actually begins. See John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and
Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a
Touch of Basics, 6 VA. TAX REV. 1, 77-118 (1986).
57. See I.R.C. § 263(a). In a limited number of circumstances, taxpayers can im-
mediately deduct expenditures that otherwise fall into the capital expenditure catego-
ry. See id. § 263(a)(1) (listing exceptions); see, e.g., id. § 179(b)(1) (permitting a max-
imum annual $17,500 deduction for certain tangible property used in a business).
58. See id. § 263(a).
59. See, e.g., id. § 167 (addressing depreciation). The terms depreciation, amortiza-
tion, and depletion refer to this ratable allocation. Although technically the amorti-
zation occurs over a recovery period, see id. § 168(a)(2), this Note uses the term
"useful life" to simplify the discussion of capitalization.
60. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1974) (noting that
depreciation attempts to match the consumption of an asset with the corresponding
income produced in later periods). The asset only needs to be subject to exhaustion
or wear, it does not actually need to waste. See Liddle v. Commissioner, 65 F.3d
329, 335 (3rd Cir. 1995) (permitting a musician to depreciate a 300-year-old bass
viol); Selig v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1125, 1127-29 (1995) (holding a show
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These imprecise definitions often leave confused taxpayers on
a path without any guideposts. Perhaps the most straightfor-
ward example of a capital expenditure is the procurement of a
physical asset.6" The presence of an asset in future tax years
gives the appearance of a sustained value that is not consumedimmediately. This logic led to the development of a one-year rule
of thumb: Treat as capital expenditures any acquisition costs for
assets with useful lives or similar secured advantages exceeding
one year. 2 Beyond its treatment of the acquisition of physical
assets, however, the simplicity of this rule deteriorates quickly,
especially for asset-related costs and intangible assets.
Ultimately, the proper classification depends primarily on fac-
tual circumstances' because both classifications can often de-
scribe the same expenditure.' As a result, the chosen classifi-
cation often reflects an overall desire to avoid a distortion of in-
come.' Minimal distortion occurs when a deduction-as a nor-
car that was never driven subject to depreciation due to technological obsolescence).
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987) (including as capital ex-
penditures "[tihe cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery
and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property").
62. See Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950). This
rule's natural corollary leads to an immediate expense for assets with lives of one
year or less. See W.B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 542, 550
(1931) (holding that where an asset is worn out after less than one year "the entire
cost is deductible from the income of that year, whether the expenditure be desig-
nated as expense or capital").
63. See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940) (stressing the importance of
each case's specific facts).
64. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933) (describing the distinction often
as one "of degree and not of kind"). This frequent lack of distinction appears in Wolfsen
Land & Cattle Co. u. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1 (1979). In Wolfsen Land, a ranch faced a
choice of cleaning a drainage ditch annually or performing more substantial work ap-
proximately every 10 years. See id. at 11-13. Both policies preserved the system and
allowed the ranch to remain functional. See id. at 11. The court acknowledged that the
"maintenance-type expense" incurred every 10 years closely resembled the annual
maintenance because it merely returned the ditch to its original condition. See id. at
13. Despite the resemblance to the annual repairs, the court concluded that the sub-
stantial amount of the 10-year expenditures warranted capitalization with subsequent
amortization in order to avoid a distortion of income. See id.
65. See Lee, supra note 56, at 10-28. In fact, the chosen classification scheme
represents an accounting method that arguably must "clearly reflect income." See
I.R.C. § 446(b) (1996) (stating that the computation of taxable income must be made
by an accounting method that clearly'reflects income); Lee et al., supra note 10 (urg-
ing the placement of future capitalization regulations under section 446).
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mal business expense or as amortization-offsets the revenue it
generates." This process attempts to match the expense with
the related revenue in the period earned." From these con-
cepts, several doctrines have emerged for distinguishing busi-
ness expenses, from capital expenditures for asset-related costs
and intangible assets.
Asset-Related Costs
Repairs
Business expenses generally include repairs to capital as-
sets.' Repairs keep property in its ordinary operating condition
without adding to either the property's life or its value.69 As
such, a deductible repair amounts to a less substantial modifica-
tion 0 than typically identified with asset replacements,"' al-
terations," or improvements." Arguably, every repair adds
66. See Lee, supra note 56, at 10-28.
67. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) ("[Section 263
serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly attribut-
able, through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income
producing.").
68. See Tress. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
69. See id. ("repairs . . . neither materially add to the value of the property nor
appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condi-
tion").
70. See Buckland v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D. Conn. 1946). Sub-
stantiality itself is another gray area:
[Tihe distinction between . . . "repair" and "replacement" is one of degree
rather than of kind .... Most repair[s] would necessarily involve substi-
tution of new parts or ingredients for old. If the substitution is of a ma-
jor [component] . . . so that the [asset] as a whole may be considered to
have gained appreciably in expectancy of useful life, it is a substitution
so great in degree that we may well place it on the "replacement" side of
the line.
Where the substitutions, though numerous, are of relatively minor
proportions of the physical structure and of any of its major parts, even
though high in cost, ... it falls more naturally on the "repair" side of
the line ....
Id.
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958) (establishing the capitalization of repairs in
the nature of replacements).
72. See, e.g., Popular Dry Goods Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 78 (1927) (capitalizing
expenditures for an annex that altered building fronts for the taxpayer's use).
73. See, e.g., Mt. Morris Drive-In Theater Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272 (1955)
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value or prolongs an asset's life because maintenance often be-
comes necessary to keep an asset operable.74 Therefore, testing
a potential change in an asset's value or life requires comparing
the asset after the repair with the asset during the period just
prior to its entering an impaired state.75 Moreover, replacement
parts with long useful lives generally are expensed despite the
capitalization suggested by the one-year rule of thumb.7' As a
limitation, however, an overriding judicial concept of a "general
plan of rehabilitation" imposes capitalization treatment on re-
pair expenses incurred in a comprehensive scheme designed to
increase'the value or life of the property.
77
Origin-of-the-Claim
The broad definition of "cost of acquisition " " requires the
capitalization of all costs associated with the original acquisi-
tion. 9 Expressed another way, this rule capitalizes all costs
(capitalizing expenditures for a drainage system needed but not installed during the
original construction of an outdoor theater), affd per curiam, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956).
74. See Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926). In Illi-
nois Merchants, a building was in danger of collapsing after a wall settled from dry
rot. See id. at 106-07. The repairs essentially prolonged the building's life by
preventing its expected immediate collapse. See id. at 107. The court allowed a cur-
rent repair deduction, however, noting that "the normal, useful, expected life of th[e]
building was not increased." Id.
75. See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962) ("The
proper test is whether the expenditure materially enhances the value, use, life ex-
pectancy, strength, or capacity as compared with the status of the asset prior to the
condition necessitating the expenditure."), nonacq. on other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 8.
76. See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968). This one-year
rule was intended merely to provide a "guidepost" for characterization without estab-
lishing a bright line rule. See id. Exceptions to the rule-of-thumb envisioned long-
lived benefits from repair "expense[s] incurred in the replacement of a broken win-
dowpane, a damaged lock, or a door, or even a periodic repainting of the entire
structure." Id.
77. See id. at 689-90. Even though when viewed in isolation the expense appears
to qualify as a repair, other facts including "the purpose, nature, extent, and value
of the work done" in the entirety may establish the existence of a plan of rehabilita-
tion. Id. at 690.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987).
79. See Estate of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964) (illustrating
the need to capitalize the last coat of paint placed on a building in the course of
construction, as opposed to generally expensing the cost of painting an existing
building), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 7; Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241, 251 (1959)
(capitalizing cleaning expenses paid to a contractor prior to the grand opening of a
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incurred to put an asset into place.8" Coined the origin-of-the-
claim doctrine, this approach examines the underlying reason
for incurring the expense; expenditures driven by an otherwise
capital transaction rationally are deemed capital themselves.8'
Aside from preventing a current deduction for an expenditure
that produces income in later periods, this doctrine preserves
the character of the expenditure by disallowing an ordinary
deduction for. a capital expenditure.82
Intangible Assets
Separate and Distinct Assets
The separate and distinct asset approach developed for intan-
gible assets is a parallel to the treatment of tangible assets."
Essentially, this doctrine searches for something it can call an
asset.' The concept of finding a separate and distinct asset de-
newly constructed building), acq., 1960-1 C.B. 4, 5, acq., 1960-2 C.B. 5, 7.
80. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 576 (1970) ("such ancillary ex-
penses incurred in acquiring or disposing of an asset are as much part of the cost of
that asset as is the price paid for it").
81. See id. at 577 (capitalizing litigation expenses incurred to determine an asset's
value because "the origin of the claim litigated is in the process of acquisition it-
self"); see also United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1963) (examining the
connection of litigation claims with the business activities of a taxpayer); Soelling v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1052, 1055 (1978) (inquiring "into the origin and character of
the claim giving rise to the expenditure"); cf United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
397 U.S. 580, 584 (1970) (Woodward companion case) (examining the whole process
of acquisition as the origin-of-the-claim and not just events occurring prior to the
passage of title). Identifying the origin may prove to be a difficult task. See John W.
Lee & Ninn R. Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15
U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 491-99 (1981) (discussing courts' attempts to apply the origin-
of-the-claim doctrine).
82. See Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (stating the
rationale that when expenses arise from a capital transaction, they must be capital-
ized rather than deducted to assure that capital gains on the property are not offset
by ordinary deductions). Despite the preservation of character, this doctrine may still
produce income distortion through timing. See Lee, supra note 56, at 29. This timing
distortion occurs when the expenditure is added to the basis of an asset with a dif-
ferent useful life than that of the expenditure. See id. Subsequent amortization of
the asset may spread the cost of the expenditure over periods that it does not bene-
fit. See id. at 29-32.
83. See John W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57
TAX NoTES 669, 674 (1992).
84. See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 786 (2d Cir. 1973)
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veloped from strong language in Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav-
ings & Loan Association.' Lincoln Savings questioned the de-
ductibility of an "additional premium" paid to the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to establish a sec-
ondary reserve.8" Unlike the general primary reserves designat-
ed for use by the FSLIC, the pro rata share of each insured fi-
nancial institution in the secondary reserve accumulated inter-
est and could either discharge that institution's future premium
obligation to the primary reserve or it could be refunded to cover
the institution's losses.8" In assessing the deductibility of the
secondary premium, the Court stated that "the presence of an
ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not control-
ling" because many expenses provide future benefits.' Instead,
"[w]hat is important and controlling.., is that the [secondary
reserve premium] serves to create or enhance for Lincoln what is
essentially a separate and distinct additional asset and that, as
an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature."9
The Court then noted the asset-like characteristics of the sec-
ondary reserve, including its senior position to the primary re-
serve to cover insured losses, the insured institutions' pro rata
property interests in the reserve, the inclusion of Lincoln's share
of the reserve on its balance sheet, and the permanent duration
of the reserve."
After the Lincoln Savings opinion, the separate and distinct
language began to appear in business expansion cases. In
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,91 the Second Circuit
considered whether a candy retailer should capitalize expendi-
tures for sales personnel hired to solicit franchise agreements
("[Tlhe words ['capital asset] must be taken in their usual and customary business
sense as items of ownership of a permanent or fixed nature which are convertible
into cash.").
85. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
86. See id. at 345-46.
87. See id. at 349-51.
88. See id. at 354.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 354-56. The Court further noted that if the secondary reserve actu-
ally satisfied the institution's future primary premium obligations, an expense deduc-
tion would become appropriate. See i& at 358.
91. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
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from drugstores outside its traditional sales region. s2 The Sec-
ond Circuit first determined that the addition of a new corporate
division to service the franchise agreements failed to create a
new business.' The additional division simply represented the
sales department that continued to function in the same candy
business."4 The court then cited Lincoln Saving's required "rad-
ical shift in emphasis" from examining the duration of the bene-
fits derived from the franchise agreements to searching for the
existence of a separate and distinct asset.s5 The court concluded
that the franchise agreements were not separate and distinct
assets because they failed to provide the franchisor with custom-
ary "ownership of a permanent or fixed nature which [is] con-
vertible into cash.""5 Therefore, the salaries were immediately
deductible."
The Briarcliff Candy decision led to similar holdings in bank
credit card" and branch expansion cases.99 The leading credit
card case, Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States,'0
examined start-up expenditures including costs to add
cardholders to the Master Charge system and to perform credit
92. See id. at 781. As city residents moved to the suburbs, the candy retailer sought
to stem losses from a diminishing consumer population by implementing a market de-
velopment strategy of soliciting independent outlets in the suburbs. See id. at 777.
93. See id. at 782.
94. See id. at 782-83.
95. Id. at 782.
96. Id. at 786. These best effort agreements afforded the franchisor "only mar-
ginally enforceable" rights. Id. at 786 n.5.
97. See id. at 787.
98. See First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
expenditures to implement a credit card operation to be deductible); Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding the
same); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 1107 (D.S.C. 1976) (holding
the same), affd per curiam, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Iowa-Des Moines Natl
Bank v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 872 (1977) (holding the same), afjd, 592 F.2d 433
(8th Cir. 1979).
99. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(permitting a deduction of market survey expenditures because branch banks simply
expand the business without creating identifiable assets). But see Central Tex. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984) (requiring capitaliza-
tion of marketing and licensing expenditures because the branch offices themselves
constitute separate and distinct assets).
100. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
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checks.'' In denying the government's argument that the cred-
it cards constituted a new business, the court found that the
cards merely represented an extension of the overall banking
business." 2 The decision explained that issuing credit cards
was analogous to, issuing letters of credit through modern
means."3 The court finally concluded that participation in the
Master Charge system failed to create an identifiable asset.'
The impetus for the courts' willingness to follow the separate
and distinct asset doctrine might be explained by a desire to
avoid the permanent capitalization of business expansion
costs.0 5 Prior to. the allowed amortization of start-up costs un-
der section 195,16 Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States' required the capitalization of any start-up costs but
left the potential for amortization conditional upon a determina-
tion of the asset's limited useful life.' In Richmond Televi-
sion, the Fourth Circuit capitalized training expenditures in-
curred prior to obtaining a broadcasting license0 9 by adding
the expenditures to the non-amortizable basis of the license."0
If courts followed this approach, many start-up costs would not
be immediately deductible and would become non-amortizable
because they would be added to the bases of non-amortizable
assets or to the business as a whole."' Instead, by following
the separate and distinct asset test that often failed to identify a
cognizable asset, courts could avoid the harsh result otherwise
101. See id. at 1187.
102. See id. at 1189-91.
103. See id. at 1190-91 ("[Here is] an established bank which adopted a new
method, use of cards and computers, to conduct an old business, financing of con-
sumer transactions.").
104. See id. at 1192 ("The start-up expenditures produced nothing corporeal or salable.").
105. See George B. Javaras & Todd F. Maynes, Business Expansion and Protection
in the Post-INDOPCO World, 55 TAX NOTES 971, 975 (1992).
106. See I.R.C. § 195 (1996).
107. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds,
382 U.S. 68 (1965).
108. See id. at 908-09.
109. See id. at 907-08.
110. See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir.
1965). The court found that the corporation's ability to renew the license created an
asset with an unlimited useful life. See ic
111. See Lee, supra note 56, at 45.
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suggested by Richmond Television."'
Future Benefit
The Supreme Court returned to the capitalization issue"' in
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner" in order to clarify Lincoln
Savings and eliminate any confusion in applying the separate
112. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192
(10th Cir. 1974) ("The government suggests no way in which [the start-up expendi-
tures] could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach . . . permits a dis-
tortion of [the] taxpayer's financial situation.).
Unfortunately, this all-or-nothing approach of either permitting a current deduc-
tion or adding the cost to a non-amortizable asset missed the middle ground of am-
ortizing the cost over a fixed period such as the life of another depreciable asset.
This middle ground would distort income less than these other alternatives. The Ser-
vice used this more sensible analysis in some of its rulings. See, e.g., Tech. Adv.
Mem. 7509099440A (Sept. 9, 1975) (capitalizing training costs for a new plant to an
intangible asset called an "operational electric plant" and permitting an amortization
period based on the life of the underlying physical plant); Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-30-
003 (Apr. 22, 1994) (capitalizing training costs in a new power plant as a freestand-
ing asset amortized over a 40-year period commensurate with the duration of an
operating license). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (allowing a
current deduction for start-up costs, in particular for training costs, due to the recur-
ring nature and short-term benefits provided by these costs in high-turnover retail
stores); cf Cabintaxi Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (ex-
plaining that start-up costs traditionally are not incurred on a continuous basis).
113. The Court addressed capitalization one year after Lincoln Savings in United
States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972). In Mississippi Chemical,
the Court examined the deductibility of bank stock purchased by farm cooperatives
as required by their loan terms. See id. at 299-300. The loan terms required each
cooperative to purchase stock with a par value totaling at least 15% of the
cooperative's quarterly interest payment. See id. Congress mandated the stock pur-
chase requirement in an attempt to raise private funds to displace public support for
farm loans. See id. at 302-05. In assessing the deductibility of the stock's cost, the
Court focused on the stock's value as part of the capital structure that maintained
this type of farm financing. See id. at 309-12. Without identifying a separate and
distinct asset, the Court concluded that the stock's ability to sustain its value into
other taxable years made the security a capital asset. See id. at 310.
Arguably, the Court's opinion in Mississippi Chemical followed a future benefits
analysis and indicated that the separate and distinct asset test was not an exclusive
test for determining capital expenditures. If Lincoln Savings had announced an ex-
clusive test for capital asset determination, it would have overruled many other deci-
sions without any discussion. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States,
7 Cl. Ct. 220, 225 (1985). Furthermore, the decision in Mississippi Chemical would
indicate that the Court was unaware of its own previous formulation of an exclusive
test. See id. at 223-24.
114. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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and distinct standard."5 The Court explained that Lincoln
Savings merely suggested capitalization for expenditures that
create or enhance a separate and distinct asset; when an expen-
diture creates a distinct asset, it cannot be ignored."6 The an-
nounced standard did not foreclose other means of determina-
tion."' In particular, the Court emphasized that Lincoln Sav-
ings never "prohibit[ed] reliance on future benefit as a means of
distinguishing an ordinary business expense from a capital ex-
penditure."" The Court stressed that something more than a
mere incidental benefit beyond the tax year in which the expen-
diture is incurred remains "undeniably important" in assessing
the proper tax treatment." 9
Future benefits embodied the long-recognized concept that an
expenditure could provide usefulness beyond the taxable year in
which it was incurred. 2 These long-term benefits characterize
an asset rather than an expense, despite the lack of a corporeal
asset.'2' In order to clearly reflect income, these expenditures
should be capitalized, and subsequently amortized, over the peri-
od benefited.'22
115. See id. at 83 & n.3.
116. See id. at 86-87.
117. See id. at 87 ("Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a separate and dis-
tinct asset well may be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to classification
as a capital expenditure").
118. Id.
119. See id. (stating that "the mere presence of an incidental future benefit--some
future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization").
120. See United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957) (characterizing
sums paid by a taxpayer to ditch companies as possessing the future benefit of
strengthening the financial position of the ditch companies to assure the taxpayer
that water would remain available).
121. See United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972); Gen-
eral Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1964) ("[Ilt is
not enough to demonstrate that [the expenditures] possess some characteristics dif-
ferent from the more commonly accepted capital expenditures (such as those directed
toward the acquisition of a recognizable and tangible corporate asset).").
122. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83-84; Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S.
1, 16 (1974) ("[Capitalization] serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a
deduction properly attributable, through amortization, to later tax years when the cap-
ital asset becomes income producing."). Unfortunately, the INDOPCO opinion also
mentioned that "deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization" and that any
deduction is a "matter of legislative grace." INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. Although some
courts apparently have interpreted this language as creating a presumption of capital-
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The Court, in INDOPCO, required capitalization for banking,
legal, and other costs incurred to facilitate a friendly
takeover.' Without pointing to a well-defined asset, the
Court relied on the lower courts' findings of substantial future
benefits secured by the merger.124 These benefits included the
potential synergy gained by pooling resources and a reduction
of "shareholder-relations expenses" by dealing with only one
shareholder. "
In contrast to the future benefits obtained by the friendly take-
over in INDOPCO, questions immediately were raised about the
viability of this argument in a hostile takeover context.'26 Some
commentators argued that expenditures incurred to resist a take-
over bid simply would not produce future benefits. 27 Even the
ization, see United States v. Binstein, No. 94-386, 1996 WL 19132, at *8-*9 (D.N.J.
Jan. 3, 1996) (stating that Code provisions granting deductions are construed strictly);
Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the same); cf.
Glenn R. Carrington, Capitalization After INDOPCO, in 53 INST. ON FED. TAXN §§
25.00, 25.02[41[b] (1995) (questioning whether the Code could be read to provide a
general rule that business expenses are currently deductible with section 263 supply-
ing exceptions for capitalization), others properly have construed the language to mean
that the taxpayer has the burden of proof for any claimed deduction. See Kim v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1595 (1995) (explaining that the taxpayers bear the
burden of proving that they should receive any claimed deductions); Georgiou v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1341, 1347 (1995) (holding the same); Stricker v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1192, 1194 (1995) (holding the same); Wise v. Commissioner,
70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1095, 1098 (1995) (holding the same).
123. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88-89.
124. See id. at 88.
125. See id. (rejecting claims that any benefits acquired were "entirely speculative'
or 'merely incidental'") (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 39-40, INDOPCO (No. 90-1278)).
126. See J. Phillip Adams & J. Dean Hinderliter, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner:
Impact Beyond Friendly Takeovers, 55 TAx NOTES 93, 98-99 (1992) (noting that the
outcome of hostile takeover attempts should be irrelevant in permitting the deduc-
tion of defense expenses); Richard M. Lipton et al., Supreme Court Approves Focus
on Long-Term Benefit in Takeover Expense Controversy, 76 J. TAX'N 324, 328-29
(1992) (considering the role of the "long-term benefit" requirement in determining
whether costs incurred during takeover attempts should be capitalized); Sarah R.
Lyke, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision Adds Wrin-
kles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1257-62 (1994) (defending
the deductibility of expenses arising from hostile takeover bids).
127. See Adams & Hinderliter, supra note 126, at 98 ("The avoidance of a detri-
ment should not be a significant benefit-any benefit is indirect and incidental, and
not the primary purpose of the takeover expense."); Paul D. Manca, Note, Deduct-
ibility of Takeover and Non-Takeover Expenses in the Wake of INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 45 TAX LAW. 815, 819-20 (1992) ("Expenses that simply repel an at-
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Service experienced significant difficulties in determining its
stance prior to INDOPCO."2 ' Likewise, the courts addressed
this issue with varied results.129 As the variety of approaches
tack do not create a long-term future benefit, they preserve the status quo and al-
low the business to continue functioning as it had before.").
128.
To briefly summarize, TAM 8516002 found costs to oppose a hostile take-
over were deductible. TAM 8626001 withdrew TAM 8516002, but TAM
8816005 reinstated it. TAM 8927005 confirmed that such costs were de-
ductible. However, TAM 8945003 revoked TAM 8927005 as being incon-
sistent with the Tax Court's decision in National Starch [IND OPCO's
case name in the lower courts]. TAM 9043003 determined that costs to
resist a hostile takeover were deductible but costs to locate a white
knight were not. TAM 9144042 ... concludes that such costs may be
deductible if the taxpayer can show it did not derive a long-term benefit.
Adams & Hinderliter, supra note 126, at 98 n.41.
129. In an early decision after INDOPCO, the Tax Court indicated that a
corporation's initial reluctance to accept a takeover bid would not be considered hostile
when the board of directors eventually adopts the merger plan. See Victory Mkts., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 648, 661-62 (1992) (emphasizing that the hostile bidder nev-
er attempted to circumvent the board of directors by appealing directly to the share-
holders). At least one commentator has suggested bifurcating expenditures in these
situations between those for the defense (deductible) and those for the agreed-upon
acquisition (capitalized). See Adams & Hinderliter, supra note 126, at 99.
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. United States, 171 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1994), permitted the deduction of breakup fees incurred while trying to avoid a
hostile takeover. See id. at 610. In that case, the target corporations incurred break-
up fees that compensated potential white knights for their expenses when proposed
friendly mergers failed and the targets fell prey to the hostile suitors. See id. at
605-07. The court distinguished these hostile takeovers from the benefits obtained in
INDOPCO by emphasizing the lack of synergies created when a corporation takes
over a target without having any experience in the target's business. See id. at 609.
Although not determinative, the court noted that, in hindsight, the targets' subse-
quent bankruptcies supported the finding of a lack of future benefit. See id. at 610.
Responding to the contention that the breakup fees were incurred to change the cor-
porate structures for the benefit of future operations, the court noted that the fees
constituted defensive tactics to protect the businesses, and they did not represent
attempts simply to change the corporations' structures. See id. at 609-10.
A divided Tax Court recently addressed the issue of a hostile takeover in AE.
Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166 (1995). In Staley, a target
corporation concerned about the potential of a takeover adopted numerous defensive
measures. See id. at 170-72. This concern was realized when a hostile suitor began
making market purchases of the target's stock and made several tender offers. See
id. at 172-74, 176-79. Despite the board of directors' attempts to avoid the takeover,
it eventually recommended the merger after concluding that it could not provide the
shareholders with an alternative plan. See id. at 178-80. Relying on the "origin-of-
the-claim" doctrine, the Tax Court majority noted that the defensive measures were
related to the change in the capital structure of the target. See id. at 195-98. Be-
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taken by commentators, the Service, and the different courts
indicate, the issue of deductibility of expenditures incurred by a
target during a hostile takeover is far from settled."'
Unfortunately, this confusion could have been avoided if the
Court denied the deduction on the basis of the potential distor-
tion of income rather than the potential future benefits. The par-
ticular reorganization in INDOPCO was designed to facilitate a
tax-free transfer to accomplish the estate planning of the majori-
ty shareholders.'13 This reorganization deferred the recognition
of gain until future tax years. If the reorganization expenditures
were deducted immediately, then income distortion would occur
when the expenses were not matched with the revenue generat-
ed by the transaction.131 Instead, matching requires capitaliz-
ing the expenditures until the future recognition of the gain.
33
Under a distortion of income approach, therefore, the presence of
a future benefit is less determinative."3 The Court, however,
deviated from its initial approach of matching"15 and searched
cause a change in the capital structure produces future benefits that justify capital-
ization under INDOPCO, the related defense expenditures also must be capitalized
because they originated from the same transaction. See id. at 196-98. A concurring
opinion by Judge Beghe emphasized that a change in ownership may not always
produce future benefits so that a proper analysis focuses on whether the benefits
occur in the current or future years. See id. at 202-03 (Beghe, J., concurring). Re-
garding the Staley merger, Judge Beghe concluded that there were future benefits.
See id. at 203-04 (Beghe, J., concurring).
Judge Cohen dissented, pointing out that the board of directors consented to the
merger only reluctantly. See id. at 214 (Cohen, J., dissenting). The consent resulted
from the board's decision that further resistance would not be successful; even after
acquiescing, the board never expected to realize future benefits from the hostile
takeover. See id. at 214-16 (Cohen, J., dissenting). The only party expecting any
benefits was the hostile suitor, not the unwilling target. See id at 215-16 (Cohen, J.,
dissenting). Another dissent, by Judge Laro, stressed that a hostile takeover itself
should indicate a lack of future benefits because expenditures for defensive measures
are not intended to produce lasting improvements. See id. at 219-20 (Laro, J., dis-
senting).
130. See Richard M. Lipton, Divided Tax Court Applies INDOPCO to Hostile Take-
overs, 84 J. TAX'N 21, 21 (1996).
131. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 80-81.
132. See Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization After the Government's Big Win in
INDOPCO, 63 TAX NOTES, 1323, 1329 (1994) ("[1It is a sin, the sin of mismatching,
to deduct expenses immediately, while deferring the gain on the sale.").
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) ("[The Code
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instead for any future benefits from the transaction.136
Although INDOPCO revitalized the future benefit concept, the
decision failed to provide guidance for assessing the minimum
benefits necessary for capitalization. The Court provided a
standardless basis by concluding that "[alithough the mere pres-
ence of an incidental future benefit--'some future aspect'-may
not warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits
beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred is undeni-
ably important in determining... the appropriate tax treat-
ment."117 Following this standard literally may require capital-
izing almost every business expenditure. 38 The Court clearly
sought to avoid that result, however, by affirming its statement
in Lincoln Savings that an ensuing benefit may not automatical-
ly require capitalization.'39 INDOPCO rejected subsequent in-
terpretations of Lincoln Savings, but did not overrule that deci-
sion.40 With the absence of a clear standard, classification de-
terminations seem to have returned to an uncertain state.
endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they
are properly attributable ...
136. See id. at 88-89.
137. Id. at 87; accord Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d
1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1984) ("While the period of the benefits may not be controlling
in all cases, it nonetheless remains a prominent, if not predominant, characteristic of
a capital item."). This style characterized INDOPCO and other predominant capital-
ization cases written by Justice Blackmun. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 507 U.S. 546, 566 (1993) ("The significant question for purposes of depre-
ciation is not whether the asset falls 'within the core concept of goodwill,' but
whether the asset is capable of being valued and whether that value diminishes over
time.") (citations omitted); Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345,
354 (1971) ("[The presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect
is not controlling"); General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716
(1964) ("[In capitalization issues] there is no readily available formula.").
138. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th
Cir. 1982) (illustrating the potential for capitalizing a salesperson's salary because
sales activities generate future benefits through goodwill).
139. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87.
140. See Javaras & Maynes, supra note 105, at 973.
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A RETURN TO UNCERTAINTY: WRESTLING WITH FUTURE
BENEFITS
The potentially broad scope of future benefits created frustra-
tion because INDOPCO eliminated the supposedly bright-line
separate and distinct asset rule.' Some practitioners claimed
that the decision's breadth produced too much uncertainty and
permitted the Service to question otherwise settled areas.'
The Service countered that INDOPCO merely affirmed the
Service's long-standing position on capitalization.' Subse-
quent rulings and decisions failed to provide any consistent
guidance.
IRS Rulings After INDOPCO
Repair Expenditures
The Service concluded that INDOPCO would not alter the
treatment of incidental repair costs.'" It explained that the de-
cision merely clarified that the satisfaction of the separate and
distinct asset rule was not a prerequisite to capitalization. "
Instead, expenditures that produce multiperiod benefits "re-
quire[ ] a careful examination of all the facts."" 6 A factual ex-
amination, therefore, would support the deduction of incidental
141. But see INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 n.6 (arguing that even with a "separate
and distinct asset" test, the term "'asset' is itself flexible and amorphous").
142. See Saunders, supra note 8, at 144 (suggesting that INDOPCO gave the gov-
ernment license to question previously undisputed deductions whenever they involve
"at least some element of future benefit"); Rita L. Zeidner, Treasury-IRS Business
Plan Wins Praise, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 1124, May 29, 1992 ("IRS field agents have
been running wild, using [the INDOPCO ruling] to deny all manner of deductions.")
(quoting Tim McCormally, Tax Counsel for Tax Executives Institute, Inc.), available
in DIALOG, TNT Database.
143. See Sheppard, supra note 9, at 1110. The Service contends that INDOPCO
merely applied existing general capitalization rules without approving a new princi-
ple of law. See id. But see Brown Lists Factors That Could Be Used To See If
Cleanup Costs Must be Capitalized, 1993 DAILY TAX REP. 45 d19, Mar. 10, 1993
(noting that despite the lack of change "we discover[ed] that we don't know what
the pre-Indopco standard was") (quoting Stuart Brown, IRS Associate Chief Counsel
(Domestic)), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DTR Database.
144. See Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36.
145. See id. at 37.
146. Id.
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expenditures regardless of some possible future benefit. 47
Advertising Expenditures
The Service also declined to change its position on the imme-
diate deduction available for advertising expenditures."' Al-
though the Service expressly acknowledged their potential "fu-
ture effect on business activities," especially from institutional or
goodwill advertising, it held in light of INDOPCO that the
amounts remain currently deductible.' As a caveat, it added
that expenditures must be capitalized when the advertising
seeks to "obtain[ I future benefits significantly beyond those tra-
ditionally associated with... advertising."5 ' To some degree,
it seems that the Service will permit a deduction when the fu-
ture benefits are indeterminable.
Business Programs Aimed at Increased Efficiency
The Service determined that severance payments made to ter-
minated employees during a business downsizing remain cur-
147. See id. By citing INDOPCO, the Service must assume that the Court's descrip-
tion of "incidental future benefit," INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87
(1992), equates with the benefits of an "incidental repair." Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1
C.B. 36. Cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9, 1994) (denying a repair deduction
due to the substantiality of more than one billion dollars spent for temporary work
performed to raise oil rig platforms and to construct a barrier wall around a storage
tank, protecting the equipment from the sinking ocean floor).
148. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
149. See id.; Peter L. Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAW.
607, 624 (1994) ("The Ruling does not indicate why advertising expenses should be
deductible, other than that they always have been.").
150. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57; cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-004 (June 30,
1995) (capitalizing commissions paid on pre-need funeral contracts due to the greater
likelihood of generating at-need funeral sales from parties to the contracts than from
more traditional advertising attempts). The Service cites Cleveland Electric Illuminat-
ing Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985), as its sole support for capitalizing ad-
vertising expenditures. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. Cleveland Electric, however,
involved publicly focused advertising to assist in the acquisition 'of a license to open
a nuclear power plant. See Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 231. The court found that
the generally deductible advertising expenditures needed to be capitalized because
the purpose of the advertising was to facilitate the purchase of a capital asset by
avoiding public opposition. See id. at 231-32. Therefore, the advertising expenditures
related to part of the acquisition price and were capitalized with an amortization
period over the life of the acquired plant. See id. at 233.
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rently deductible. 5' After citing INDOPCO for the proposition
that "the mere presence of some future benefit may not warrant
capitalization," 52 the Service drew an analogy between the
costs of repairs or advertising and the severance payments in a
downsizing. 5 ' In each case, it determined that the potential
future benefit would not warrant capitalization even though the
downsizing may "reduc[e] operating costs and increas[e] operat-
ing efficiencies."" Echoing the origin-of-the-claim doctrine, the
Service found that the severance payments were "principally re-
late[d]" to employee services in the past.'55
In Revenue Ruling 95-32, the Service considered expenditures
incurred in a utility company's programs designed to achieve in-
creased energy conservation and efficiency. 5' Aside from ad-
dressing concerns about the environment and society, the pro-
grams enabled the utility to "reduce its future operating and capi-
tal costs."'57 In addition to capitalizing the costs on its financial
151. See Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19.
152. Id. at 19-20.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 20; cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-005 (June 12, 1992) (permitting a deduction
of settlement costs incurred to cancel a coal supply contract because the ability to
reduce operating costs by making spot market purchases produced only speculative
future benefits). But cf INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1992)
(finding substantial benefits in a report stating that "management 'feels that some
synergy may exist'" and that the company experienced reduced "shareholder-rela-
tions" costs in "reporting and disclosure obligations, proxy battles, and derivative
suits . ..and in the interests of administrative convenience and simplicity, to elimi-
nate previously authorized but unissued shares" of stock).
155. See Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19, 20; cf. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-40-003 (June
30, 1995) (concluding that bonus payments made to stock option holders in a merger
originated in employment relationships instead of the merger); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-
27-005 (Mar. 15, 1995) (holding the same). This reasoning follows the origin-of-the-
claim doctrine by carefully identifying the transaction that gave rise to the payment
obligation.
156. Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8; cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-48-004 (Aug. 9, 1995)
(allowing an expense deduction for conservation expenditures that are not designed
to acquire new customers); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) (permitting a
deduction for expenditures made by an electrical utility for conservation programs).
157. Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8. Utilities frequently use these programs to
avoid the more expensive construction of additional capacity; to build goodwill
through advertising and public relations; or to respond to the encouragement of utili-
ty commissions that seek natural resource conservation, consumer electricity rate re-
ductions, and environmental protection. See Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, Demand Side
Economics, 67 TAX NOTES 1249 (1995).
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books, the utility received favorable rate structure treatment from
the state regulatory commission based on these program expendi-
tures.'58 The rates that the utility could charge its customers in-
cluded an amount designed to generate a rate of return on the
unamortized cost equal to other rate-based investments. 5 ' The
utility also could include a portion of the costs avoided through
the program's conservation efforts in its rate base.60
The Service permitted a current deduction for the utility
company's expenditures.' The ruling noted that the programs
neither acquired nor retained any asset.'62 Moreover, the ruling
stated that despite INDOPCO, the "kinds of benefits" obtained
from reduced operating and capital costs do not warrant capital-
ization." Although this ruling may apply only to regulated in-
dustries such as utilities, the ruling may also reflect the tacit
recognition by the Service that INDOPCO permits the deduction
of many different costs incurred by businesses in their hopes of
generating greater profits through lower operating costs.'
Environmental Cleanup Costs
In three technical advice memoranda and a revenue ruling,
the Service chartered a shifting course in environmental clean-
up expenditures. The first technical advice memorandum re-
158. See Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8, 9.
159. See id. at 9.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. Although assisting customers in designing efficient systems, the utility
did not obligate customers to purchase their future power from the utility;, therefore,
future sales were not assured. See id.
163. Id.; cf T.J. Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 581, 593 (1993) (allowing
deductions for payments to a retiring shareholder that enabled the franchisee to re-
duce its operating costs by paying lower royalty payments to the franchisor). The
ruling tacks on an ambiguous qualification that "these kinds of benefits, without
more" would not be considered under INDOPCO, but it did not indicate what type of
circumstances might require capitalization. Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8, 9 (empha-
sis added); cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) (permitting a deduction for
conservation and load management expenditures because a potential reduction in
"operating costs is not in and of itself sufficient to require capitalization").
164. See Gann & Strowd, supra note 157, at 1251. Read broadly, the ruling sug-
gests that a speculative reduction of operating and capital costs may provide insig-
nificant benefits under INDOPCO. See iUL
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quired capitalization of expenditures made to replace asbestos
insulation in manufacturing equipment.'65 The magnitude of
the benefits obtained by removing health risks and increasing
the equipment's marketability belied the taxpayer's character-
ization that the replacement constituted an incidental re-
pair.166 One significant factor examined by the Service was the
degree of permanence of the expenditure-a repair "remedies
immediate consequences," whereas the taxpayer's replacement
permanently cured the problem." 7
In another memorandum, the Service again considered the
abatement of asbestos, located this time in a building." Rely-
ing on similar reasoning, the costs of removing the asbestos
were capitalized, but the costs incurred in encapsulating the
asbestos were deducted. 6 ' The difference in treatment focused
on the respective permanent and temporary solutions to the
problems. 7 '
The final memorandum addressed the remediation of soil con-
taminated with hazardous waste.'7 ' The Service focused pri-
marily on the increase in value obtained by owning uncontami-
nated property.'72 It did not find compelling the taxpayer's ar-
guments that the land was simply returned to its original state,
and the Service required capitalization for the expenditures made
to increase the property's value. 7' Former Chief Counsel for In-
165. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
166. See id. The taxpayer argued that the value of the property had not increased
because the property was returned to its original state. See id. The Service denied
the taxpayer's reliance on Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333,
338 (1962), nonacq. on other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 8, where the Tax Court measured
an increase in value by comparing the asset's value before the impairment and after
the expenditure. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992). The Service determined
that the Plainfield-Union test did not control the present case, and asserted that the
test is relevant only when repairs are necessary because of the progressive deteriora-
tion of the property. See id.
167. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
168. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
169. See id.
170. See id. ("By removing the asbestos, the taxpayer permanently eliminated the
defect . . . . [whereas] the effects of the encapsulation on taxpayer's property are
temporary.").
171. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
172. See id.
173. See id.
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come and Accounting, Glenn Carrington later revealed that the
costs were capitalized to the basis of a gas pipeline that caused
the original contamination. 74 The ability to depreciate the pipe-
line, as opposed to land, would avoid a distortion of income.
Despite the position taken on soil remediation in its December
1992 memorandum, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 94-38,
permitting a deduction. 7 ' With a similar factual pattern, the
ruling explained that the soil treatment failed to produce any
permanent improvements. 76 Moreover, the treated land failed
to provide any "significant future benefits" under the INDOPCO
standard.77 Finally, the land's value was tested prior to the
treatment and immediately afterward to assess any change in
value, but the Service found no increase in value because the
treatment "merely restored" the asset to its original condition. 78
One explanation for this perceived change in position,'79 ap-
pears in the ruling's concluding remarks that if the cleanup costs
were capitalized to the land, then the costs could not be amor-
tized."o An immediate deduction, therefore would create less
distortion of income than permanent capitalization.' 8'
174. See Carrington, supra note 122, § 25.03[51[c], at 25-29.
175. 1994-1 C.B. 35.
176. See id. at 36. In contrast, the soil and water treatment facilities did provide
future benefits and therefore expenditures related to their construction were capital-
ized. See id.
177. Id. The lack of future benefits might not be creditable given that the cleanup
avoided future environmental liability and the threat of the EPA closing the plant.
178. See id. The Service finally applied the Plainfield-Union test previously ad-
vanced by taxpayers in other environmental expenditure disputes involving progres-
sive deterioration. See id.; Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333,
338 (1962), nonacq. on other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 8.
179. But see David G. Coolidge, Note, A Square Hole for a Square Peg: Section 165
and Environmental Cleanup Costs, 14 VA. TAX REV. 779, 783-87 (1995) (discussing
increased political pressure for a clear deduction scheme for environmental cleanup
costs prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 94-38).
180. See id. But see supra text accompanying note 174.
181. See Carrington, supra note 122, § 25.03[51[c]; cf supra notes 105-12 and ac-
companying text (discussing the willingness to permit immediate deductions for
start-up costs to avoid permanent capitalization).
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Adding in the New Business Complication
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States,'82 con-
sidered the future benefits obtainable from employee training
during a business expansion."8 The expansion occurred at an
electric utility through the construction of both a nuclear power
plant and a conventional fossil fuel plant.'
The New Method: Nuclear Power
Cleveland Electric first considered the expansion of a tradi-
tionally coal powered electric utility into a nuclear facility."
Employees of the company's fossil fuel plants required extensive
training and licensing prior to their transfer to the nuclear plant
to commence operations at the new facility.' The company at-
tempted to deduct the training costs as ordinary and necessary
business expenses."7
The court compared the different methods of generating elec-
trical power and concluded that the nuclear plant represented a
new business for the utility company." Despite the identical
end product of electricity, the higher degree of required training
and the means used to generate heat distinguished the nuclear
plant from a conventional fossil fuel plant.'89 The higher de-
gree of required training reflected the potential dangers to pub-
lic safety and the additional support systems located in a nucle-
182. 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985).
183. See id. at 227-30. Although decided prior to INDOPCO, the opinion expressed
the reasoning later established by the Supreme Court in rejecting a restricted reading
of Lincoln Savings. See id. at 225 ("[Lincoln Savings] does not state . . . that if the
separate and distinct asset test is not met the payment is a necessary and ordinary
expense."). The Claims Court found the presence of future benefits significant in mak-
ing a capitalization determination. See id. at 224 ("IT]he fact that a substantial expen-
diture is likely to give long-lived benefit ... is always an important, if not dominant,
factor in the direction of tangible or intangible capital asset treatment.").
184. See id. at 222.
185. See id. at 225-26.
186. See id. at 226-27.
187. See id. at 222-23.
188. See id. at 228-29.
189. See id. ("[Tihe means by which heat is produced in a nuclear plant to gener-
ate steam for the generators differs from the process in a conventional plant.").
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ar reactor." Furthermore, only after completing this training
could the facility obtain the license necessary to begin opera-
tions."' In combination, the method of generating heat, the ex-
tensive training, and the need for a license convinced the court
that this plant actually represented a new business. '92 As the
first nonconventional electric plant in the whole company, the
nuclear reactor constituted a new business for which the train-
ing costs should have been capitalized as a "one-time" start-up
CoSt.
193
In support of its capitalization treatment, the court also indi-
cated that the future benefits expected from a trained workforce
justified capitalization." The initial training "would obviously
add value to the services" provided by the employees beyond the
first operational year."9 5 These trained employees could then
help to train future hires and thereby lower the cost of future
training.196 Moreover, the license obtained after the training
provided the future benefit of the "right to do business";97
therefore, the costs incurred to secure the license, in particular
the extensive training, required capitalization.9 "
By combining a characterization of a new business enterprise
190. See id. at 229.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 228-29. The court relied heavily on the construction and operating
agreements between the taxpayer and an independent contractor that provided the
utility with a completed facility, including trained personnel. See id. at 227. The
court reasoned that the expenditures, therefore, represented the acquisition price for
a "going business" that properly required capitalization. See id. at 227-28; cf Estate
of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964) (capitalizing the last coat of
paint in the cost of acquiring a completed building), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 7. In dictum,
however, the court noted that even without considering the agreements as a pur-
chase of a business, the expenditures still constituted nondeductible start-up costs.
Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 228.
194. See Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 229.
195. Id. The future benefits included the reasonable expectation that the entire
trained staff would not leave simultaneously and require the plant to close while
training a new staff. See id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id.; cf Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th
Cir.) (capitalizing training expenditures made to obtain an FCC license), vacated and
remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
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with the expectation of future benefits from the training, the
court concluded that all of the training expenditures required
capitalization.' 9
The Old Method: Fossil Fuel
The court also considered the training costs associated with
an expansion into another conventional power plant..2 " Like
the nuclear plant expansion, this fossil fuel plant employed
workers from preexisting plants after training them to work in
the new facility.
21
The court determined that the expansion into another fossil
fuel plant did not constitute a new business.0 2 The new plant,
despite its larger size and modern pressurized furnaces and com-
puters, was not different in kind due to its fundamentally con-
ventional nature.03 The limited training needed to commence
operations supported the finding of similarity with the utility's
other fossil fuel plants, because the additional training matched
the amount generally needed for newly hired employees.2"4 Fi-
nally, the new plant lacked the licensing prerequisite of nuclear
plants; therefore, the training costs were not attributable to a
portion of a license acquisition cost.
205
Characterizing this transaction as an expansion of an existing
business, the court found appropriate an immediate deduction
199. See Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 228-29; cf. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-30-003 (Apr.
22, 1994) (defiming employee training as a freestanding asset in a factual situation
similar to Cleveland Electric, and permitting the amortization of that asset over the
40-year term of the nuclear regulatory license); see, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem.
7509099440A (Sept. 9, 1975) (capitalizing training costs for a new plant to an in-
tangible asset called an "operational electric plant" and permitting an amortization
period based on the life of the underlying physical plant). But see Tech. Adv. Mem.
96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (allowing a current deduction for start-up costs, in particu-
lar for training costs, due to the recurring nature and short-term benefit provided by
these costs in high turnover retail stores).
200. See Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 233-35.
201. See id. at 233.
202. See id. at 234.
203. See id. at 233-34 ("incorporating modern features not available when the [other
fossil fuel plants] were built ... [failed to make it] essentially different in kind").
204. See id. at 234.
205. See id.
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for the training expenditures." 6 After mentioning the general
deduction available for training costs incurred in teaching em-
ployees to operate new equipment in the same business, the
court indicated that the utility trained its own employ-
ees-unlike the nuclear facility that purchased a plant from an
agent who trained the utility's employees-and only incurred an
insubstantial amount of expenses." 7 Even though the training
would provide some future benefit, the court found that "the re-
cord does not reflect that immediate benefit was lacking and it
is impractical to make any division of the expenditure for such
purpose.""8 Therefore, the training expenditures remained or-
dinary and necessary business expenses.0 9
Attempting a Reconciliation
The opposite conclusions for the plants in Cleveland Electric
present two fundamental problems. First, the "new business"
label attached to the nuclear plant seems awkward in light of
the court's discussion of the fossil fuel plant. While discussing
the fossil fuel plant, the court stated that the incorporation of
modern features into a plant would not change the character of
the business, and it cited favorably the bank credit card expan-
sion cases that involved producing the same product through
new means.210 This comparison should not differ when analyz-
ing the means used to generate steam-whether by nuclear en-
ergy or coal-because the underlying business never changed.
The utility company remained in the electric business simply by
incorporating modern techniques into its production methods.
The second problem with the court's reasoning lies in distin-
guishing the future benefits obtained from the training in both
plants.21" ' Presumably, the initial training at each plant would
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 234-35.
209. See id. at 234.
210. See id. (citing First Natl Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977);
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974)). The
credit card cases essentially involved producing the same end-product--consumer
loans-through a new process, using credit cards. See supra notes 98-104 and accom-
panying text.
211. The court reasoned that the nuclear facility incurred a one-time training
1997] 1289
1290 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1257
provide similar future benefits regardless of whether the em-
ployees are located in a "new" business or part of an expan-
sion.212 If the proper classification depends upon the expecta-
tion of future benefits, then the training expenditures at both
facilities should have received the same treatment.213 Either
they both provide future benefits and invoke capitalization re-
quirements, or they both lack future benefits and warrant an ex-
pense deduction.
The capitalization of the nuclear plant training costs might
appear more sensible when viewed alongside the decision in
Richmond Television. 14 Like the nuclear facility, Richmond
Television involved an expanding business that reimbursed an-
other agent for providing it with a trained workforce prior to its
obtaining an operating license.215 In addition to finding that
the corporation incurred the expenditures prior to commencing
its broadcasting operations, the Fourth Circuit characterized the
training costs as part of the acquisition price of a capital as-
charge capitalizable as a start-up cost, see Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 228-29,
whereas the fossil fuel plant faced recurring training costs. See id. at 233. This rea-
soning lacks merit in light of the employee turnover and additional training required
to maintain a nuclear facility. See Lee, supra note 83, at 672 (arguing that employee
turnover at nuclear plants is high and employee retraining costs are substantial).
212. See Lee, supra note 83, at 672.
213. The enactment of section 195 produces problems when analyzed along with the
future benefit test of INDOPCO. Section 195 permits a new business to amortize
start-up costs provided that a business in its normal operations could deduct those
costs-i.e., the start-up costs of a new venture are the same as expansion costs of
an existing business. See I.R.C. § 195(b)(1), (c)(1)(B) (1996). INDOPCO suggested that
start-up costs would provide future benefits once a business began operations; there-
fore, expanding businesses must capitalize these costs. See Javaras & Maynes, supra
note 105, at 975; see, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (considering
field agent assertions that pre-opening costs of a retail store in an expanding busi-
ness will create future benefits under INDOPCO). If expanding businesses are re-
quired to capitalize their expansion costs, section 195 would become meaningless be-
cause no start-up costs would qualify for a deduction by an existing business. See
Javaras & Maynes, supra note 105, at 975. Conversely, if expanding businesses are
required to capitalize start-up costs because they provide future benefits, section 195
would favor "new" businesses by permitting amortization of the start-up costs of
newly created businesses. See id.
214. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated
and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
215. See id. at 903-04. The corporation eventually obtained a three-year broad-
casting license from the FCC. See id. at 904.
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set-the FCC license.216 Similarly, the nuclear training costs in
Cleveland Electric appeared to relate to the purchase of an as-
set-the plant's operating license-rather than to expenses in-
curred in the business's normal operations. Both Richmond Tele-
vision and Cleveland Electric resemble purchased intangible
asset cases and not future benefit cases. 17
JUST-IN-TIME MODIFICATIONS AT DANAHER CORPORATION
Danaher Corporation implemented a JIT system to replace its
batch processing system for producing various retail prod-
ucts. 218 The desired processing scheme emulated "flow produc-
tion" by allowing production units to pass from one stage to the
next without interruption. 19 Each production stage used a
"cell" that combined several operations that previously had oc-
curred separately. Each cell performed the entire manufac-
turing process, from start to finish, unlike the prior assembly
line process.221
The new cell approach required a reconfiguration of the ex-
isting plants.'m To place the needed equipment within a cell,
the machines used in the old assembly lines were relocated and
connected together in the cells.21 In completing the conver-
sion to a cell environment, Danaher also painted the cell space,
made electrical and plumbing modifications to accommodate the
equipment, and rigged the machinery to operate in a continu-
216. See id. at 907-09.
217. See Lee, supra note 83, at 673.
218. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995). Danaher manufactures truck
"Jake Brakes," industrial fasteners, Allen wrenches, fuel leak detection systems,
hand tools, and industrial process controls. See Ditkoff Letter, supra note 3.
219. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995) ("Previously, [Danaher]
transported units to the next production stage as soon as they [were] ready. Under
the new system each stage is required to go back to the previous stage to pick up
the exact number of units needed."); see also supra note 32 (discussing Danaher's
kanban system).
220. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. ("[Danaher] reengineered its assembly lines to put together operations
that have never before been together."). One example of the changes was Danaher's
modification of the factory layout to U-line configurations within cells. See id.
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ous flow. 4
In addition to reconfiguring the plants, Danaher conducted in-
depth training to prepare its current employees for working in
the cell environment.2" The training focused on JIT concepts
and the need for continuous improvement in manufacturing pro-
duction.22 6 This training provided a new production-oriented
vocabulary and placed the responsibility for decision making
within the cells.227 The training also expanded the employees'
skills so that each employee could operate machines that previ-
ously remained functionally separated; the multiple operations
performed within a cell required each employee to become
knowledgeable about all of the machines contained in a cell.2"
Danaher sought to deduct the training costs associated with
this conversion, but the Service issued a Technical Advice Mem-
orandum requiring capitalization. 229 Relying on Cleveland Elec-
tric, the Service considered the expenditures necessary to estab-
lish a workforce trained in JIT and to enable the plant to
function in a cell environment." ° In particular, the Service ex-
amined whether Danaher had entered a new business and if it
could expect future benefits from the training."'
The Service found that the changed production process and
the training required to make the system operational constituted
a new business."2 In Cleveland Electric, the court had deter-
mined that generating electricity by nuclear energy differed from
fossil fuel generation because they involved different processes
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id. The new responsibility included the authority to stop work within a
cell upon the discovery of waste and to adjust the cell accordingly to eliminate the
waste. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. Danaher also attempted to deduct the reconfiguration costs, costs of
materials and supplies used in making signs for the process, costs for training
manuals and videos, and consulting fees. See id. The Service required the capitaliza-
tion of each of these costs. See id. This Note concentrates primarily on the training
expenditures.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
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used to produce the same product. 3 The Service reasoned
that, like Cleveland Electric, Danaher's redesign of its operations
represented a fundamental change in manufacturing." 4 Under
this analysis, manufacturing the same end product becomes
irrelevant because the focus shifts to the new means used to
manufacture that product.
The extensive training required to facilitate this new process
also provided persuasive support to the new business character-
ization." Cleveland Electric identified the high degree of
training required to enable employees from its coal facilities to
operate a nuclear plant. 6 Similarly, Danaher's conversion to
JIT manufacturing required significant training in the use of
unfamiliar machines and required employees to assume greater
individual responsibility for the work product. 7 The training
was so extensive that Danaher referred to its new processes as,
requiring a "New Technician.""8 Thus, the extensive operation-
al changes combined with the training required to operate the
system provided the basis for concluding that Danaher had
started a new business.
The potential future benefits from the initial training comple-
mented the Service's conclusion to capitalize the costs. 9 De-
spite Danaher's arguments about the continuous evolution of the
JIT process, the Service found that these expenditures may have
benefitted the current year, but that they also provided future
long-term benefits.' Without a detailed discussion, the Ser-
vice relied on Danaher's own statements that JIT provided long-
term benefits by reducing capital costs through lower inventory
levels, and by creating a more flexible manufacturing opera-
233. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985).
234. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
235. See id.
236. See Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 229.
237. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
238. Id. ("[Danaher does] not object to the view that 'the transformation of [the]
workforce represented nothing less than the creation of a 'New Technician'.") (quot-
ing Danahees factual submission to the Service).
239. See id.
240. See id.
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tion.24 These submissions allowed the Service to conclude that
the costs were appropriately capitalized under the INDOPCO
rationale. 2
Rethinking Danaher's "New Business"
The Service's new business characterization overemphasizes
Danaher's description of the magnitude of change in its plants.
Danaher's factual submission to the Service echoed the senti-
ments of romantic JIT advocates.2" Marching in step with the
JIT revolution, Danaher suggested not only that its facilities had
undergone a "radical redesign, [but that it had also implement-
ed] a fundamental change" in its production methods.'
Danaher used a management driven "top-down" approach to im-
plement the "broad processes and dramatic improvements" in-
volved in the change.245 As the "cornerstone" of its new philoso-
phy stood the "New Technician," an employee with expanded
responsibility and greater flexibility in an environment freed of
many former barriers.2" These statements led the Service to
conclude that the new production process no longer resembled
the former process. 7
Unfortunately, this characterization ignores the realities of
the conversion. A wholesale conversion never happened. Instead,
Danaher continued to operate the plants in their former assem-
bly line fashion while creating operational cells one at a time
over a period of several years.248 Moreover, the "top-down" ap-
241. See id. ("[Danaher] also agree[s] that JIT manufacturing has already produced sig-
nificant long-term benefits for us.") (quoting Danaher's factual submission to the Service).
242. See id.; see also INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992)
(stating that a taxpayer's realization of future benefits, although not determinative,
is an important factor in deciding whether expenses must be capitalized).
243. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
244. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
245. Id.; see Sheppard, supra note 10, at 1155 (describing conversions from batch
manufacturing to JIT manufacturing as a "sea change").
246. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
247. See id.
248. See Sheppard, supra note 10, at 1155 (noting that this piecemeal approach
was expected to take place over a eight-year period); Sheridan, supra note 19, at 29
(noting that at the Jacobs Vehicle plant, employees received only one hour of train-
ing each week over a six-month period).
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proach consisted of a decision to adopt the new philosophy and
to resequence the production operations. 9 Changes in the ac-
tual process were not expected until sometime in the future
when the "New Technicians" implemented refinements to the
system."5 Although employees' attitudes may have changed, a
dramatic renovation was not obtained immediately. The training
taught the employees to perform tasks previously done by oth-
ers; it did not train employees in methods new to the business
itself.Y
1
These realities weaken the comparison to Cleveland Electric.
Cleveland Electric considered a newly constructed plant designed
to operate with nuclear power rather than with fossil fuel. 2
The court concluded that the methods used to generate heat
differed substantially; a nuclear facility requires specific designs
that are neither compatible nor interchangeable with those of a
coal facility.a Conversely, Danaher implemented JIT in exist-
ing facilities.' The manufacturing processes remained the
same; the implementation merely altered the timing of the vari-
ous stages of production and which employees performed which
specific tasks. Making adjustments to the delegation of duties
and timing of production fails to constitute a fundamental
change in the production process.
The degree of training required to implement JIT also differs
from the training needed to make a nuclear plant functional. In
Cleveland Electric, the court found that a high degree of training
became necessary to prepare employees for both safety risks and
249. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
250. See id.
251. A potentially broad view of reengineering may force the capitalization of many
training costs. Consider the dramatic impact of conversions within law and account-
ing firms from centralized word processing functions to networked computers in indi-
vidual offices. See American Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation Comm. on Tax Ac-
counting, Report on Capitalization Issues Raised Under Sections 162 and 263 by
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 TAX LAW. 181, 195 n.45 (1996). Viewed broadly,
the Service's approach requires capitalizing these training costs of a "new business"
even though these costs have been currently deducted in other circumstances.
252. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 225-27 (1985).
253. See id. at 229. Arguably, after the heat generated steam, the processes for uti-
lizing the steam could be identical. The fundamental nature of the facilities, howev-
er, still might differ.
254. See Ditkoff Letter, supra note 3.
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support systems that were not present in a conventional coal
plant. 5 Furthermore, the training enabled the utility company
to acquire an operating license to commence its operations. 26
Danaher's operations used the same equipment from its assem-
bly line production without requiring employees to learn pro-
cesses or equipment that the company never had used."7 This
training may be analogous to new hire training: teaching people
to perform tasks foreign to the individual but very familiar to
the company. The JIT training itself was geared toward deci-
sion-making processes and understanding the overall JIT manu-
facturing philosophy. 8 The training enriched employees' abili-
ties to make changes in an ongoing process without changing
the fundamental features of the production process. Further-
more, no regulatory agency required Danaher to conduct this
training to acquire an operating license.
The dissimilarities between the utility company in Cleveland
Electric and Danaher strongly suggest that a new business was
not commenced when Danaher implemented JIT manufacturing.
Instead, the Service's new business characterization deferred the
need to ultimately address the issue of the deductibility of train-
ing expenditures. By characterizing Danaher's new JIT produc-
tion operation as a new business, the Service could immediately
require capitalization because employee training represented
start-up costs. This treatment allowed the Service to offer little
discussion of the appropriateness of capitalization under
INDOPCO's future benefits analysis. If the Service properly ex-
amined this training, by considering its future benefits, the Ser-
vice should have permitted an immediate business expense de-
duction.
Future Benefits from JIT
The Mode of Analysis
Despite all of the doctrinal approaches to resolving capitaliza-
255. See Cleveland Elec., 7 C1. Ct. at 229.
256. See id.
257. See Ditkoff Letter, supra note 3.
258. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995).
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tion questions,2 9 a basic desire to clearly reflect income under-
lies the ultimate decision regarding deductibility.21c This con-
cept might be understood by considering that for tax accounting
purposes, an "asset" represents capitalized costs rather than
property interests; these deferred costs are capitalized because
they will be expensed only in the appropriate future period.2
Even though the doctrines discussed earlier might suggest capi-
talization,262 this suggestion should comport with the idea that
capitalizing costs must not distort income.21 In general, deduc-
tion of expenditures that provide future benefits, without creat-
ing clearly identifiable assets, will produce minimal distortion of
income when the expenditures appear insubstantial in amount,
are short-lived, recur regularly in approximately equal amounts,
or lack a clear association with future tax years.2
Insubstantial or short-lived expenditures warrant an immedi-
ate deduction because they produce virtually no threat of a seri-
ous distortion of income.2' This approach technically will pro-
duce some distortion, but the amount of distortion generally is
259. See supra notes 50-140 and accompanying text.
260. See Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or En-
hance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443, 452 (1974). The clear reflection
of income occurs when expenses are matched with the revenues they generate. See
id. Deducting costs before the revenue is produced understates income in early years
and overstates it in later years, whereas denying a deduction until after the revenue
is generated overstates income in the early years and understates later years. See
id.; supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
261. See Gunn, supra note 260, at 445.
262. See supra notes 68-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of capitaliza-
tion doctrines.
263. See Gunn, supra note 260, at 450 ("Recognition that capitalization is a basic
principle of income taxation rather than a technical requirement imposed by specific
statutory language may help to avoid the error of looking for the answers to close
questions concerning capitalization in the words of the Code."); accord Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967) (rejecting the contention that
section 263 is dispositive on capitalization issues and indicating that the principles
of capitalization and clear reflection of income are "inextricably intertwined").
264. See Lee, supra note 83, at 680.
265. See, e.g., Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d
563 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (permitting current expense deductions when a company consis-
tently deducts all property valued at less than its internal 500-dollar minimum rule).
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immaterial compared to the total overall income.266 In particu-
lar, the accounting burden needed to eliminate the distortion
outweighs any advantage gained by a more precise measure-
ment through capitalization and subsequent amortization.267
A deduction for recurring expenditures of roughly equal
amounts avoids income distortion because the yearly deduction
approximates the amount otherwise deductible through amorti-
zation. 8 For example, deducting the cost of assets with five-
year lives, valued at one hundred dollars and purchased annual-
ly, approximates the yearly total deduction representing twenty
dollars of straight-line amortization for five one-hundred-dollar
assets over each of their five-year lives.269 Although perfect
266. See Gunn, supra note 260, at 456 (accepting accounting methods that produce
some income distortion, provided that the distortion is insubstantial in relation to
total income).
267. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry., 424 F.2d at 572. Expressed another
way:
Where the burden on both taxpayers and [the] Service to account for
each item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of distortion
of income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so impracticable
that it demands that nevertheless all items be accounted for individually,
no matter what the trouble or the onus.
Id. The real difficulty involves determining what amounts are insubstantial in rela-
tion to a particular taxpayer and tax year. See Lee, supra note 56, at 17-18; com-
pare Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex Pac. Ry., 424 F.2d at 572-73 (finding $500
insubstantial) with Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220,
234 (1985) (finding $15,545 insubstantial).
268. See Gunn, supra note "260, at 455.
269. See id. Professor Calvin Johnson criticized this approach for focusing on the
consistency of the income steam after a transition period but failing to account for
the larger after tax investment made possible by an immediate deduction. See
Johnson, supra note 132, at 1337. He argued that when a taxpayer makes an in-
vestment of I, at a tax rate of t, the taxpayer saves tI in taxes by taking an imme-
diate deduction so the after tax cost of the investment is I(1-t); a counterpart who
capitalizes the investment has no deduction available and can invest only after tax
income represented by /(l-t). See id. at 1325 nn.12-13. Although the invested
amounts appear equal, the second taxpayer paid Ti in taxes on the invested income
first; therefore, holding the taxpayers' net cash outflows equal, the first taxpayer can
always invest more-generally by a factor of --I- -due to the tax savings. See(- )
id. at 1325. He concluded that this treatment generates after tax returns for the
larger expensed investment equivalent to the pretax returns of the capitalized invest-
ment-like a "miraculous exemption" from tax for all subsequent returns on a capi-
talized investment. See id.
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consistency rarely occurs, it is not required." This approach
explains the present treatment of some expenses. Despite efforts
Professor Johnson correctly identified but overstated the magnitude of this prob-
lem. By premising the invested amount on after tax income, see Calvin H. Johnson,
Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1032-33 (de-
fining this premise of tax-sensitive investments as a scope condition), the analysis
obscured the combined effects from the expense/capitalization alternatives and the
method of finance. To isolate the effects of expensing and capitalization, the initial
investments must be equal for the two taxpayers regardless of whether the funds
come from income, debt, or other sources. With equal investments, the miraculous
exemption disappears, but it becomes apparent that the cash flows from these two
alternatives differ. In particular, only the taxpayer who expenses the investment re-
ceives tax shields of Ti during the transition period to the steady state; both taxpay-
ers have the same net cash flows in the steady state; and only the taxpayer who capi-
talized the investment receives a benefit of Ti from the exclusion of the return of cap-
ital once the steady state terminates. As alluded to by Professor Johnson, the
expensing alternative is preferred by taxpayers because the tax shields of tI occur in
earlier years. The additional value of the expensing alternative, therefore, equals the
present value of each tI cash flow during the transition period less the present value
of. each tI cash flow during the termination period (the present values during the ter-
mination period will approximate zero, discounted at a rate of r over n periods, as the
present value factor 1 approaches zero when n approaches infinity).(l+r)'
Despite the timing discrepancy, expensing should still be permitted to avoid the
rigors of capitalization. The difference in timing indicates that some distortion of in-
come will occur. The elimination of this distortion by following a more theoretically
accurate approach, however, requires higher accounting costs. Although arguably tena-
ble for large institutional taxpayers, the limited benefit obtained from capitaliza-
tion/amortization cannot justify the additional burden for small businesses and indi-
viduals. See Lee et al., supra note 10. Instead, the deductions for steady state expen-
ditures fall into the group of simplified methods that achieve "rough justice." See id.
270. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th
Cir. 1982). In dicta, Judge Posner considered reasons for allowing authors of books
to deduct expenses immediately without capitalizing them as costs of producing a
book. See id. He concluded that:
If you are in the business of producing a series of assets that will yield
income over a period of years[,J ...allocating these expenditures among
the different books is not always necessary to produce the temporal
matching of income and expenditures that the Code desiderates, because
the taxable income of the author or publisher who is in a steady state
(that is, whose output is neither increasing nor decreasing) will be at
least approximately the same whether his costs are expensed or capital-
ized. Not the same on .any given book-on each book expenses and re-
ceipts will be systematically mismatched-but the same on average.
Id. The Service has cited favorably the reasoning of Encyclopaedia Britannica. See,
e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-37-006 (Apr. 24, 1992).
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to evaluate the degree of asset modification for repair expens-
es, 271 considerations of insubstantiality and recurrence better
justify an immediate deduction: Repairs are inexpensive and
recurring whereas improvements are costly and infrequent.272
Similarly, advertising costs remain deductible despite their fu-
ture benefits because they occur regularly. As long as the
method of accounting avoids a distortion of income, a capitaliza-
tion doctrine should not mandate an alternate method to pro-
duce the same result.
27 4
Finally, when the expenditure lacks a clear association with
future benefits, an immediate deduction may seem appropriate.
In general, when taxpayers can establish a relationship between
the expenditure and any benefits, the costs should be capitalized
as a freestanding asset and subsequently amortized over the
period benefited to clearly reflect income."' Accordingly, rea-
sonable approximations of an asset's useful life should suffice to
avoid distortion.7 6 In cases when even an approximation be-
271. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
272. See Gunn, supra note 260, at 458.
273. See Lee, supra note 83, at 683-84; see generally Faber, supra note 149, at 625.
274. The emphasis on avoiding income distortion makes it clear that some recur-
ring expenditures may require capitalization when the income production component
is absent. For example, in Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799 (8th Cir.
1996), a mining company attempted to deduct annual payments made to a corpora-
tion formed by several mining companies to self-insure for black lung claims filed by
employees. See id. at 800-01. The mining company made fairly constant annual
payments, based on the projected future value of all claims derived from the individ-
ual mines. See id. at 801-02. In addition, each insured who terminated its policy be-
fore the expected date faced an "early termination charge" for premiums that it
would have paid had it remained open until its expected closing date. See id. at
801. Claims against mines, however, typically occur in the year that the mine closes
because many employees continue to work the mines even after contracting black
lung disease. See id. at 800-01. The Eighth Circuit found that the lack of a correla-
tion between the relatively high payments in the early years and the relatively low
risk of loss in these early years indicated that the payments actually constituted
prepayment for future claims. See id. at 807. In this situation, only the portion of
the early payments directly related to the shifted risk of loss-the current benefit of
insurance-in the early years was deductible. See id.
275. See Lee, supra note 56, at 38; cf Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 1, 13 (1979) (capitalizing substantial and infrequent repair expenditures as
separate assets, and permitting amortization during the period prior to the next re-
pair to avoid a distortion of income).
276. See Lee, supra note 56, at 38-41; accord Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540,
543-44 (2d Cir. 1930) (advising courts to approximate the value of expenditures after
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comes impractical, however, an immediate deduction will mini-
mize the distortion of income.277 An immediate deduction
seeins particularly appropriate for some intangible assets given
the potential prohibition on amortization when taxpayers cannot
establish the assets' useful lives.278
Clear Reflection of Income and JIT Training Expenditures
Following the approach outlined above, Danaher should cur-
rently deduct the training expenditures without distorting its
income. Although the expenditures themselves may be substan-
tial, the training itself recurs on a regular basis, both in new-
hire training and through JIT's objective of seeking continual
improvement, and any future benefits cannot be successfully
estimated.
Unlike some small expenditures that warrant an immediate
deduction because they could not materially distort income,
Danaher's training expenditures may be fairly substantial. At
issue was approximately $3.2 million in JIT training expendi-
tures incurred over five years. 279 Without attempting to mea-
sure the substantiality of this amount in comparison to
Danaher's annual sales revenue of more than $800 million," ° it
is possible that an immediate deduction might distort income."
a taxpayer proves that some amount was incurred).
277. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 961-62 (4th Cir. 1981) (allow-
ing a deduction for current expenditures that cannot be associated practically with
any other time period, although they may have future benefits), rev'd on other
grounds, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane). When future amortization is un-
available, a present deduction tends to distort income to a lesser degree than does
capitalization without amortization. See Lee, supra note 56, at 26.
278. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960) ("No allowance will be
permitted merely because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible
asset has a limited useful life.").
279. See Sheppard, supra note 10, at 1155. The T.A.M. required capitalization of
approximately $9 million spent during the conversion, including $3 million for
equipment reconfiguration, $.66 million for supplies, $3.2 million for training, and
$2.1 million for consulting fees. See id.
280. See Ditkoff Letter, supra note 3; supra note 267 (describing problems encoun-
tered in defining "substantial amounts").
281. The amount spent on JIT training may be insignificant in comparison to past
spending on corporate improvement. Although Danaher's focus on JIT represents a
new approach, the funding for the training probably reduced amounts spent on other
efforts that also sought to create corporate improvements. See generally Hal Gann &
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The recurring nature of training, however, strongly suggests
that it should be deducted. Like repairs, advertising, and other
periodic expenses, training frequently occurs on an ongoing ba-
sis. Businesses require this periodic training for updating cur-
rent employees' skills, introducing new processes, and training
new employees. This proposition seems particularly relevant in
situations such as Danaher's. As the JIT system continues to
evolve and the plant undergoes continuous improvement, addi-
tional training becomes necessary."' A current deduction,
therefore, would represent the same annual expense as amorti-
zation spread over each benefited year.
Reliance solely upon the recurring nature of training to justify
a current deduction would provide a fairly weak argument for
two reasons. First, the Danaher ruling fails to disclose the
amount of subsequent training. A deduction for recurring expen-
ditures depends primarily upon the relatively steady state of the
incidence of particular expenditures.' To the degree that the
initial training costs exceeded the expected amounts of future
training expenditures, the clear reflection of income doctrine
would require capitalizing the excess and amortizing it over its
useful life."M Second, even if the training expenditures re-
curred in approximately equal amounts, both an immediate
deduction and capitalization with amortization would clearly
Roy Strowd, INDOPCO-Time for the Second Shoe to Drop, 69 TAX NOTES 1045,
1046 (1995) (discussing the reallocation of resources to JIT from the overall corpo-
rate improvement budget). Given the fairly constant budget allocation for recurring
expenditures in most corporations, it seems likely that JIT replaced programs that
had attempted to accomplish similar feats using different methods. See id. Thus, a
current deduction for the training expenditures would distort income only to the ex-
tent that these expenditures represented outlays that were not available in any oth-
er year. See id. (noting that the sudden capitalization of otherwise recurring expens-
es may distort income particularly if that pattern is not disrupted uniformly in all
industries and for all taxpayers).
282. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995); supra notes 30-31, 38-41 and
accompanying text (discussing JIT's habit of improvement).
283. See Gunn, supra note 260, at 455.
284. Consideration of only formal training costs may view this issue too narrowly.
Formal training should be considered part of the broader learning costs incurred
throughout implementation. These costs occur when the process evolves through con-
tinuous improvement efforts. For example, 'down-time costs, incurred when a line is
stopped to investigate and revise procedures that contain waste, will occur on a reg-
ular basis.
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reflect income. As long as a method does not distort income, it
appears justified. In that situation, neither expensing nor capi-
talizing the expenditures seems preferable. In situations like
Danaher's, however, capitalizing the costs appears to create a
potential distortion of income, creating a preference for an im-
mediate deduction.
INDOPCO's future benefit inquiry ensures that expenses will
closely match the revenue generated by those expenses. The
INDOPCO decision never encouraged the blind capitalization of
expenditures with future benefits; instead the Court stated that
the existence of future benefits would remain "undeniably im-
portant" in assessing the proper tax treatment.2" In this light,
the proper tax treatment would be to foreclose options that dis-
tort income.
In Danaher's situation, a high potential for distorting income
exists if training costs are capitalized because the expenditures
lack a clear association with any future benefits. The goal of
matching expenses with the corresponding revenue is circum-
vented when the income or benefits themselves cannot be identi-
fied. This result becomes clear when considering the future ben-
efits obtained from employee training in JIT manufacturing
principles.
Undoubtedly, Danaher anticipated receiving some future ben-
efits from a JIT program. Danaher's own submission to the Ser-
vice indicates that JIT could significantly reduce the capital in-
vested in an inventory stock and could permit modifications of a
manufacturing line to meet customer specific needs. 86 Al-
though the expectation of future benefits suggests capitalization,
the expectation of benefits alone seems to indicate a business
purpose for the expenditures. The expectation of future benefits
closely resembles the expense requirement that an expenditure
be "necessary"; both merely suggest that an expenditure be "ap-
propriate and helpful."287 Businesses incur almost every expen-
285. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992).
286. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995); cf supra notes 151-64 and ac-
companying text (discussing rulings that permitted the deduction of expenditures
made to decrease future operating costs).
287. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (construing the term.
"necessary" as requiring simply that expenses be "appropriate and helpful").
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diture with the hope of achieving some benefit.
The distinction between the benefits requiring capitalization
and those supporting an expense deduction depends more on the
likelihood of eventually realizing these benefits. The Court in
INDOPCO referred to an "incidental future benefit" that could
justify an immediate expense.2" This reference presumably in-
dicates that insubstantial benefits can be measured by their
probable occurrence."'9 To the extent that expected benefits ap-
pear remote, the justification for an immediate deduction gains
strength. According to this reasoning, the potential benefits ex-
pected from employee training are uncertain and the related
expenditures should be deducted.
The training in the JIT philosophy failed to provide assurance
of any benefits. Understanding the philosophy is just the begin-
ning of the process. The real improvements in the system do not
happen until employees identify waste and successfully elimi-
nate it.2"' This process does not occur overnight. The training
only provided employees with the mindset for working in the
JIT environment29 --it prepared them to use their existing
knowledge and skills to change the production process. The
training alone did not solve problems.
Training costs' lack of association with future benefits appears
in the current treatment of employee training costs. 92 The Ser-
288. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87. The Court noted that the Code's language
"envisions an inquiry into the duration and extent of the benefits realized ... I." L
at 88.
289. See Adams & Hinderliter, supra note 126, at 96 (identifying contradictory
language in INDOPCO that first required the "presence" of future benefits, implying
certainty and existence, but later discussed "availability," "opportunities," and "antici-
pated" future benefits, suggesting only potential or contingent benefits).
290. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing JIT's focus on contin-
uous improvement).
291. For example, at Jacobs Vehicle Equipment Co., a subsidiary of Danaher, the
first hurdle for implementing JIT was internal resistance. See Sheridan, supra note
19, at 28. The company president got "into a shouting match with [his] manufactur-
ing management" who feared change. Id. (quoting George Koenigsaecker). Overcom-
ing this resistance, therefore, required a large amount of training and coaching just
to mentally prepare employees for the change. See id. at 29.
292. Unfortunately, the Service's guidance on the treatment of training costs pro-
vides little insight into the factors that it encourages taxpayers to consider. The Ser-
vice states that:
Amounts paid or incurred for training, including the costs of trainers and
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vice itself stated in the Danaher ruling that ongoing employee
training costs generally are deductible.29 This deduction for
ongoing training costs tacitly admits that the potential of future
benefits does not require capitalization." Presumably, train-
ing provides the same type of future benefits regardless of
whether it occurs on the first day of a program or on subsequent
days. 5 The similarity of the benefits obtained during any
training schedule strongly supports the notion that all training
should receive the same expense or capitalization treatment.
Expense treatment of training expenditures seems to accord
with rulings issued in other areas. The Service has acknowl-
edged future benefits but permitted expense treatment for ad-
vertising' and programs designed to cut costs and improve
efficiency.297 In each instance, the expenditures are incurred
routine updates of training materials, are generally deductible as business
expenses under... section [162] even though they may have some fu-
ture benefit. Training costs must be capitalized only in the unusual cir-
cumstances where the training is intended primarily to obtain future ben-
efits significantly beyond those traditionally associated with training pro-
vided in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's trade or business.
Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-53 I.R.B. 1 (citations omitted). Aside from indicating that the
treatment of training costs have not changed, see id., this guidance falls to address
why JIT training must be capitalized whereas other training costs remain deductible.
293. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995) (citing Cleveland Elec. Illumi-
nating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 234 (1985)).
294. See Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-53 I.R.S. 1 ("Amounts paid or incurred for train-
ing. . . are generally deductible . . . even though they may have some future bene-
fit."); cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28, 1994) (permitting a deduction for con-
servation and land management expenditures because a potential reduction in "oper-
ating costs is not in and of itself sufficient to require capitalization").
295. Arguably, greater benefits might occur when employees first learn about the
JIT system than when their learning is refined in the later stages of JIT implemen-
tation. Early benefits might include discovering and solving the "easy" manufacturing
problems during the initial period, while refinements to the JIT system deal with
less consequential or less obvious changes; i.e., there is a diminishing marginal re-
turn. This pattern, however, supports the argument for an immediate deduction be-
cause the primary benefits occur in the years of the early training. Any residual
benefit to future periods is fairly insubstantial.
296. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57; supra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text (discussing advertising expenditures).
297. See Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8 (allowing deduction for programs cutting
consumer use of electricity); Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19 (allowing deduction for
severance pay in downsizing); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-48-004 (Aug. 9, 1995) (allowing
deduction for electricity conservation program); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-13-002 (Nov. 28,
1994) (allowing deductions for the same); supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text
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with the expectation of receiving benefits beyond the current
period. Yet each received an immediate expense deduction.
Danaher essentially has sought only to create a sustainable
competitive advantage though manufacturing excellence. It re-
mains impossible to determine what aspect of JIT may produce
an advantage for Danaher's manufacturing operations. Without
an ability to assess the duration of expected benefits or what
those benefits may be, the costs should be currently deducted to
avoid a distortion of income. With the recurrence of training
within the business, a present deduction will not distort income
as would capitalizing the costs.
Aside from lacking a clear association with future benefits, a
reasonable estimation of a beneficial period seems improba-
ble.29 Apparently, the Service tried to estimate the period of
expected benefits from Danaher's training.299 This attempt in-
cluded bifurcating the annual training costs into their present
and future benefit."' Unfortunately, the training costs were in-
cluded in the basis of an "asset" that also included the reconfig-
uration, supply, and consulting costs. 0' The connection be-
tween the useful life of training and the other costs seems ex-
tremely weak because training and supplies, for example, that
are lumped together in the capitalized asset lack a strong corre-
lation in their respective useful lives.0 2 Subsequent adjust-
ments to the period of expected future benefit also raise ques-
tions about the estimate's reliability."0 ' In the end, the Service's
(discussing business programs aimed at increased efficiency).
298. The lives of intangible assets are particularly difficult to estimate due to the
frequency of technical obsolescence, operational and enterprise changes, managerial
turnover, and alternative managerial techniques (like JIT) that replace older meth-
ods. See Gann & Strowd, supra note 281, at 1047; cf. Newark Morning Ledger Co.
v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 566 (1993) (stating that even when taxpayers can
demonstrate the value of intangible assets, the demonstration of a useful life creates
a "burden [that] often will prove too great to bear").
299. See Sheppard, supra note 10, at 1155.
300. See id. The Service permitted an immediate deduction of 10% of the costs in
the first year as the present benefit and decreased the capitalized portion, as the fu-
ture benefit, an additional 10% in each subsequent year. See id.
301. See id.
302. Cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-30-003 (Apr. 22, 1994) (distinguishing the normal in-
ability to ascertain a workforce's useful life from the situation in which the life can
be measured against another asset such as an operating license).
303. Initially, the Service permitted Danaher to expense the capitalized costs over
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efforts lacked any degree of accuracy.
34
The lack of a clear association between the future benefits and
the training expenditures indicates that these expenses should
be deducted immediately. Attempts to allocate the deductions
arbitrarily over a period of years provide a great potential for
an eight-year period. See Saunders, supra note 10, at 64. Later, Danaher demanded
a $600,000 tax refund based on its eligibility for a research and development credit.
See id. Arguably, if the change to JIT represented a radical departure from tradi-
tional manufacturing, Danaher's JIT venture should qualify as research and develop-
ment. See id. Apparently in an effort to compromise on the credit, the Service per-
mitted a five-year amortization period. See id.
It is not clear why a five-year amortization period was not selected originally.
The Service seemed to argue that Danaher entered into a new business and that
the training costs were start-up expenditures. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-44-001 (July
21, 1995). Under section 195, start-up expenditures qualify for a five-year cost recov-
ery period. See I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1996). Thus, the amortization period for the train-
ing expenditures should also occur over five years, to maintain symmetry. Apparent-
ly the Service agreed and an IRS representative indicated that the compromise on
five years was intended to place Danaher in the same position as if it had acquired
a new business. See Ada Rousso & Ron Schiel, Life After INDOPCO: Are Business
Expansion Costs Deductible?, 27 TAX ADVISER 399, 401 (1996).
304. Assuming arguendo that the benefitted period could be estimated, the training
costs should be capitalized as a freestanding asset, but this would distort income
because the asset could not be amortized. See I.R.C. § 197(c)(2) (1996) (excluding
from amortization self-created going concern value and a workforce in place). The
training costs should be amortized over their useful life, and not simply tacked on to
the basis of some other asset and amortized over that asset's useful life. But see
Ithaca Indus. v. Commissioner, 17 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that even
though amortization is theoretically possible "there can be no defensible estimation
of the duration of any one person's employment, nor of the useful life of the
workforce of which he or she is a part"). As a freestanding asset, however, the
training costs would represent either self-created going concern value-the increase
in value of the company with "knowledgeable" employees-or a trained workforce.
Both of these intangibles are ineligible for amortization under section 197. See I.R.C.
§ 197(c)(2).
The denial of amortization for self-created intangibles is premised on the fact
that the business already has deducted the costs to produce the asset. A workforce
in place, for example, was created by deductible training expenditures incurred over
time. If INDOPCO requires capitalization of the training expenditures because they
create the intangible workforce in place, then the taxpayer's only hope to recover the
costs is through amortization. As mentioned supra, section 197 forecloses amortiza-
tion for self-created intangibles. See id. Therefore, the costs only could be recovered
upon the liquidation of the business. This failure to match expenses and revenue
would produce income distortion, and it would create a preference for companies that
purchase intangibles such as a workforce in place, because they can amortize those
assets even though the same assets cannot be amortized by a company that created
them through its own efforts. See id. § 197(c)(1).
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income distortion."05 Although in some situations an immediate
deduction also would distort income, the recurring nature of em-
ployee training generally, and training connected with a continu-
ous improvement philosophy specifically, provides reasonable
assurance that income distortion will not occur.
RECURRING EXPENDITURES WITH POTENTIAL FUTURE BENEFITS
By emphasizing the need to match expenses with benefits
when assessing capitalization, a practical solution for identifying
the limited scope of INDOPCO can be obtained. It seems clear
that the INDOPCO decision never intended for all expenditures
generating any future benefits to require capitalization; instead,
the existence of potential future benefits only suggests capital-
ization."6 When those benefits cannot be identified clearly,
however, the purpose of capitalizing the costs to avoid a distor-
tion of income seems defeated. Using the need to clearly reflect
income as guidance, recurring expenditures should be character-
ized as deductible expenses despite the potential for benefits in
other tax years. Although exact matching will not occur, the
results will "on average" produce the right results without un-
due administrative difficulties.0 7
This method of permitting a current deduction for recurring
expenditures lacking an association with future benefits can
support well-established deductions questioned by the
INDOPCO decision. In addition to employee training, other ex-
penses fall into the same pattern. The broad scope of these other
examples has raised concerns that capitalizing all expenditures
that provide future benefits might be too expansive a rule. Other
305. Note that the arbitrary 15-year amortization period for intangible assets under
section 197 reflects an attempt by Congress to maintain revenue neutrality rather
than an attempt to approximate the useful lives of the assets. See Gann & Strowd,
supra note 281, at 1046.
306. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992) (finding the
presence of future benefits "undeniably important," but not determinative, in assess-
ing capitalization treatment).
307. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th
Cir. 1982) (noting that revenue and expenses on each individual transaction would
be "systematically mismatched," but that they would, on average, produce the de-
sired results).
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examples include various forms of advertising; salaries of corpo-
rate executives working on both present and future projects;08
salaries of sales personnel that enhance the company's good-
will;0 9  board of director fees for considering corporate guid-
ance; routine business and tax planning;3 10 and labor relation
expenditures that develop positive working relationships with
unions.31" ' Each of these expenditures remains functionally re-
curring for most businesses. They are not extraordinary. These
types of expenditures can be deducted currently without distort-
ing income.
CONCLUSIONS
The definitions of an expense and a capital asset continue to
evolve. Gradually their outlines have been shaped into recogniz-
able forms. Capital assets carry with them the characteristic
normally attributed to a tangible asset, that of providing future
value to the holder. Conversely, expenses provide little prospect
of value and warrant an immediate deduction. Despite the diffi-
culties inherent in assessing future benefits, this distinction re-
mains important and requires separate tax treatment.
Although most considerations of the capitalization issue focus
on the "asset," an attempt to clearly reflect income should actu-
ally guide the ultimate determination. For many expenditures,
income distortion is avoided if the amount of the expenditure is
insubstantial, if the expenditure is recurring, and if no associa-
tion with future benefits can easily be ascertained.
Employee training that accompanies the implementation of a
JIT manufacturing system requires an immediate deduction.
Companies that implement JIT merely change their operating
philosophy without entering into a new business. Any anticipat-
ed benefits resulting from the change remain too contingent to
308. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 962 (4th Cir. 1981), reu'd on
other grounds, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
309. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217; cf Cabintaxi Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 63 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering selling expenses incurred to
generate a business's first sale).
310. See Faber, supra note 149, at 639.
311. See Saunders, supra note 10, at 64.
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justify capitalization. Given the recurrence of training in most
companies, the costs should be deductible.
Glenn Walberg
